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Donald Trump came roaring onto the political stage when he announced his presidential 
candidacy in 2015. In the years that followed, he amassed a loyal following of motivated voters. 
During the Trump era, his followers have developed a reputation for loud bigotry, shameless 
xenophobia, and unmasked white supremacy. The movement has to come to strongly resemble 
the nativist populism that, until Trump, was generally confined to Europe. In order to better 
understand the motivation of Trump voters and their intense dedication to the 45th president, I 
surveyed 82 voters from the Midwest about their feelings towards politicians, policies, and 
political opponents. The Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey offers both qualitative and 
quantitative responses and suggests that Trumpism has redefined identity politics for Trump and 
Biden voters alike. I find that the great consequence of Donald Trump is not the mass movement 
of white working class Americans to the Republican party, it is the accelerated evolution of the 
identity of cultural whiteness that has come to bind together the Republican base. 
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Introduction 
Early in the morning of January 6, 2021, crowds started to gather in the United States 
Capitol. Thousands of enthusiastic supporters of the recently defeated President Donald J. Trump 
packed into the Ellipse in Washington, D.C., ready to participate in the “Save America March.” 
The crowd waited in breathless anticipation until the event finally started around 11:00am. First 
sons Eric and Donald Jr. kicked off the festivities with energizing speeches, promising any 
Republicans who voted to certify the election results that “we’re coming for you.” During 
Donald Jr.’s speech, Fox News decided to break away from their live coverage and air regularly 
scheduled programming instead. Shortly thereafter, Rudy Giuliani, the president’s lawyer and the 
head of the legal effort to overthrow the 2020 election results, took the stage. Rudy continued to 
rile up the crowd, promising “trial by combat” and claiming irrefutable proof of widespread 
election fraud. The crowd, by this point thoroughly excited, was about to get what it wanted 
more than anything else: Donald Trump. The president delivered an hour long speech that ended 
with a critical instruction “let’s walk down Pennsylvania Avenue.” 
 It started like any other Trump rally, but the end result was anything but typical. Around 
12:30pm, law enforcement reported that nearly 15,000 people were marching towards the 
capitol. At 12:53pm, rioters pushed past the outermost capitol barrier. At 1:03pm, only 10 
minutes later, Capitol Police were pushed back to the base of the capitol steps. Even while all of 
this was happening, law enforcement officers discovered pipe bombs planted outside both the 
Republican National Committee and Democratic National Committee buildings. Thankfully, 
they never detonated. 
 At 1:30pm, Capitol Police are forced to retreat up the steps of the capitol and make their 
first formal request for National Guard activation. Around this time, Mayor Muriel Bowser 
makes an official request for military support. Also around this time, Capitol Police Officer 
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Brian Sicknick was trampled and sprayed with chemical irritants, eventually leading to his death. 
At 2:12pm, rioters breech the United States capitol. Law enforcement makes the decision to 
forfeit the building entrance in order to prioritize protecting the lawmakers inside the capitol. As 
action moved inside the building, the millions of Americans around the country following along 
on television could not tell what was happening, as the cameras no longer had a view of the 
action. Around this time, reports of shots fired began to circulate. At 2:22pm, Vice President 
Mike Pence was escorted out of the senate chamber. Two minutes later, at 2:24pm, Trump 
tweeted, “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done to protect our 
Country and our Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the 
fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the 
truth!” This has been widely interpreted as support and encouragement of the riot. Around 
3:00pm, photographs and videos of rioters in the House chamber and members offices started 
circulating on television and social media. Shortly thereafter, Trump supporter and Air Force 
veteran Ashli Babbitt was fatally shot by capitol police as she forced entry into the capitol. Pence 
called the acting defense secretary and asked him to “clear the capitol.” Not until after 5:00pm 
did National Guard and military personnel arrive at the capitol. The rioters were cleared from the 
building in the afternoon of the January 6th and all lawmakers escaped with their lives, but 
investigations into the insurrectionists remain active as of mid-April 2021 (Petras et al., 2021 & 
Tan, Shin & Rindler, 2021 used as references for the above timeline). 
In the end, the January 6th insurrection cost five lives and brought America within mere 
seconds of catastrophic damage to democracy. In the capitol that day were the Vice President, 
the Speaker, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 99 other senators, and hundreds of 
members of congress. It could have been a disaster.  
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 In order to understand how America got to a point where thousands of American flag 
waving “patriots” stormed their own capitol and became the first hostile force to breach the 
building since 1812, one must look at the movement from whence they came. The insurrection 
did not come out of nowhere, nor was it unpredictable. It was the culmination of the Trump era 
and a representation of the strength of the convictions that accompany Trumpism. Understanding 
Trumpism is critical to understanding the modern era of polarized American politics. Donald 
Trump’s ability to energize a crowd, while an effective campaign tool, is not what made the 
insurrection happen. This thesis will prove that Trump supporters share a deep-rooted social 
identity and a blind loyalty to Trump. This drove them to believe Trump’s lies without evidence, 
to hate those who stood in their movement’s path, and, eventually, to engage in violence so 





Trumpism Takes the Nation by Storm 
In November of 2016, the world—especially the academic and political world––was 
shocked by the election of President Donald Trump. The businessman and reality television star 
built a campaign that not only fostered but encouraged xenophobia and the belief that white 
hegemony was at risk in America. Perhaps because of the racial signaling of the campaign, as 
well as Trump’s tendency to speak crassly and insult his opponents and colleagues, common 
consensus was that educated white Republicans– especially women–would abandon him in the 
election. An October 2016 article from The Washington Post insisted Trump had little chance at 
electoral success, saying that “Trump's problem is that he has not been able to persuade women 
to vote for him — and that his pitch seems to keep getting worse” (Bump, 2016b). These 
premature post-mortem dissections of the Trump campaign were common among the major 
media outlets. Everyone, perhaps including Trump himself, thought that the Hillary Clinton 
campaign would cruise to a comfortable margin of victory and academics would be left to study 
a short-lived and anomalous popular nativist campaign. This was wrong. Donald Trump won a 
large number of electoral votes, mostly due to unforeseen success in rust belt states like 
Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Pundits, political scientists, and politicians 
immediately set about trying to understand who was responsible for Trump’s victory.  
In the first weeks and months after the election, one common narrative was that the 
Clinton campaign overreached in attempting to flip traditionally red states and spent too little 
time and too few resources in Democratic leaning states in the rustbelt (Brownstein, 2016). 
Attention then turned to blaming media and journalistic mishandling of the campaign, which lent 
legitimacy to a movement that was fueled by offensive rhetoric. In the end, however, it became 
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clear that a coalition of voters who, prior to the rise of Trump, felt neglected by American 
politics was responsible for Trump’s election. This “basket of deplorables,” which includes 
former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke along with a slew of neo-Nazi sympathizers 
threatens to become the new base of the Republican party, ushering in a new, unprecedentedly 
divisive era of American politics. Politicians like Matthew Gaetz, Marjorie Taylor Greene, and 
Josh Hawley look to replace the old guard conservative establishment like Mitt Romney, Rand 
Paul, and Lindsay Graham. Figures such as the late John McCain are already legendary, near-
mythical characters of the past. The 2020 electoral defeat of Donald Trump has changed the 
immediacy with which the American political arena must confront Trumpism, but it does not 
make Trumpism any less relevant. These voters are here to stay, as are the divisive social issues 
that bring them together. Trumpism emphasized and intensified the rift that divides Republicans 
and Democrats in this country, and we, as political scientists, have a responsibility to understand 
who Trump voters are and what drives them to support Trump. 
Research Question 
What, other than party loyalty and party affiliation, drives Americans to vote for Donald 
Trump and why do Trump supporters remain faithful to their candidate? My thesis will examine 
the motivations, identities, and beliefs of Trump voters in an attempt to understand why such an 
untraditional candidate garnered such widespread support. Undeniably, the Trump campaign and 
administration sparked a massive political realignment based largely on race, class, and 
education––a new identity politics. I want to further understand what made Trump’s message 
and persona so attractive to some voters and so repulsive to others. How do Trump voters define 
themselves, see the country, and evaluate the president? Political scientists will never be fully 
able to understand the current moment in our country without first knowing how and why we got 
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here. By taking both quantitative and qualitative approaches to this question, I will be able to 
make claims about the 2016 and 2020 elections that are not reliant on data manipulation, 
educated guesswork, or mere theorization. I will work towards a definition of a group with which 
liberal academia is generally out of touch. Understanding the Trump voter is essential to 
understanding America.  
Literature Review 
Understanding the voters who are part of the Trump coalition and why they voted for 
Trump requires an exploration of existing theories around his rise to power. Scholars will 
continue to unravel this shocking political event for the decades to come, but over the four years 
since the 2016 election, some well-developed theories have been published. They are laid out in 
separate sections below, but these theories, of course, work in tandem with one another. I will 
start with theories around the growing polarization in America, which is generally based around 
identity and not policy. Next is the undeniable presence of white supremacy within the Trumpist 
movement. Both identity formation and white supremacy are supported by media and voter 
perceptions of media. Lastly, there are several theories about the coalition of Democrats and 
“never Trumpers” who worked together to elect Joe Biden. No single explanation will tell us 
why voters were attracted to Trump, yet we must ascertain how various theories have worked 
together to create Trumpism.  
Popular Polarization 
The Trump era has brought the polarization that divides the nation to the forefront of the 
political arena. Political scientists have been exploring this issue for the past twenty five years, 
tracking social changes that welcomed polarization. Robert Putnam (1995) first observed a 
decline in what he calls “social capital,” a theory of social well-being that emphasizes networks, 
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relationships, and civic engagement. In his 2000 follow up, Putnam concludes that two factors, 
the polarization of media and significant generational change spurred by the internet and 
communications advances, are responsible for the majority of the decline in social capital (p. 
283-284). Putnam pushes further, claiming that a greater proportion of social capital is now 
represented by bonding relationships, which are homogenous, than by bridging relationships, 
which bring heterogenous groups together (p. 362-363). The consequence of the breakdown of 
social capital has been a less interconnected and more polarized society. Thus, as people become 
more wrapped up in their own in-group, the candidates whom they prefer will become more 
extreme. Donald Trump is the ultimate bonding candidate, encouraging rural white identity 
formation while demonizing minority groups. Mason (2018) has observed a dramatic increase in 
American polarization. In her book Uncivil Agreement, she argues that American partisans have 
become obsessed with the battle between Republicans and Democrats (p. 51-57). In-group 
members, she argues, show significant bias towards members of the same group, placing 
overwhelming emphasis on scoring political victories while matters of substantive policy are 
relatively under-emphasized (p. 47). Abramowitz and McCoy (2019, p. 139-140) have referred 
to this phenomenon as negative partisanship, wherein partisans are more motivated by voting 
against the opposition than by voting for their own party (see also Abramowitz & Webster, 
2016). The Trump coalition was, perhaps, just as interested in hating Hillary Clinton as they 
were in loving Donald Trump. The demonization of the former Secretary of State played a 
prominent role in Trump’s rhetoric (Diamond, 2016). Further, in a theory Mason refers to as 
identity sorting, Americans have grouped multiple identities together (p. 65). Party is often 
aligned with race, religion, income, and other demographic factors. As the nation becomes more 
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sorted, there has been a decrease in cross-cutting identities, which encourage relationships across 
typical boundaries.  
 One such identity that has played an increasingly important role in party politics 
is the rural American, or perhaps, more accurately, the white rural American identity. In a 
groundbreaking ethnography of Wisconsin inspired by the gubernatorial victory of Republican 
Scott Walker, Katherine Cramer (2016) conducted dozens of hours of interviews with rural 
Wisconsinites, cultivating a portrait of midwestern rural resentment. Cramer’s methodology of 
listening allowed her to understand the mindsets of these voters without formulae or numbers (p. 
26-44). She found that, unequivocally, rural residents strongly resent urbanites and government 
programs, feeling unjustly ignored and slighted by government programs and politicians (p. 91-
100 and throughout). In supporting Republican candidates, they do not necessarily vote against 
their own interest, for their interest is constructed out of their identity. Despite the fact that they 
might benefit from more government, these people vote for less government because, in their 
experience, government has left them behind (p. 164-168). The rural resentment which she has 
studied is one of the foremost explanations of the support Donald Trump has garnered. Trump 
has used the rhetoric of persecution, pointing to immigration, liberal elitism, and people of color 
as the source of economic misfortune in rural communities. Cramer herself (2016b) claims that 
rural resentment was one of the foremost reasons Trump was able to secure the presidency. 
Trump dug into the resentment of the rural class, feeding their emotional state and encouraging 
them to continue feeling emotions of resentment (Ciulla, 2020). The president has consistently 
managed to fuel resentment towards “professionals, mainstream politicians, liberal journalists, 
the well-educated, and the experts” (Ciulla, 2020, p. 34). In other words, the elite.  
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The President’s invocation of these anti-establishment, anti-opposition, and pronationalist 
ideas, including three of his favorite refrains “drain the swamp,” “lock her up,” and “Make 
America Great Again,” represent typical populist rhetoric (Oliver & Rahn, 2016). Similar to 
Mason (2018), Oliver and Rahn (2016) suggest that the homogeneity of the Republican base as 
well as the political distance between the conservative base and the center opened the door for 
right-wing American populism (p. 202). Further, nationalist identity building, which is a 
common hallmark of populism, was a strong focus of Trump’s during the 2016 campaign. His 
supporters began to see themselves as the only true Americans, justifying any means to achieve 
their goal of reclaiming their country. In a similar vein, Graham and Svolik (2020) have found 
that increasing polarization is negatively correlated with voter concern for democratic 
institutions (p. 398). While an overwhelming majority of voters express support for democratic 
norms, very few voters will vote against their party’s candidate, even if she supports anti-
democratic policies, explaining why so many Republicans voted for Trump despite the threat he 
posed to democratic institutions. This has the potential to be a permission system for politicians 
to endorse increasingly polarizing legislative action with little fear of electoral retribution 
(Graham & Svolik, 2020, p. 399). Much of the Trump-related consternation from the left and the 
center focused on his lack of respect for democratic norms; Trump’s supporters were 
unconcerned by this, for the far-greater threat was a Trump electoral loss.  
Building a Coalition of Whiteness 
While Cramer (2016) attempts to explain the Trump appeal as bigger than racism, there is 
no question that racism and rural resentment as presented in Cramer’s study go hand in hand. 
Race-motivated resentment and anti-immigrant resentment both likely played a major role in the 
2016 election of Donald Trump (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018). In fact, when all else is held 
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constant, racist and anti-immigrant sentiment is one of the greatest predictors of supporting 
Trump (Hooghe & Dassonneville, 2018).   
In 1996, Kinder and Sanders created the racial resentment scale for the American 
National Elections Survey (ANES) in order to help political scientists understand the role of 
racism on public opinion. Engelhardt (2019) has found that, over time, white Democrats have 
seen marginal decreases in racial resentment while white Republicans have expressed slowly 
increasing racial resentment. However, since 2018, there has been an acceleration, with white 
Republicans becoming significantly more resentful while white Democrats are becoming less 
resentful. Cramer (2020) attributes this realignment as well as the racialized support for Donald 
Trump to the (imagined) “threat to the white racial order” represented by people of color and 
immigrants (p. 164). She goes on to say that rather than questioning whether cultural or racial 
anxiety spurred the Trump movement, politicians and political commenters should recognize that 
both economic and racial fears are at play. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) have opined that, 
while typically white Americans have less in-group identity than members of other racial and 
ethnic groups, emphasizing collective risk to white dominance awakens white consciousness (p. 
9). The authors fear that the Trump coalition may be the beginning of a new age of white identity 
politics in America (Sides et al., p. 3, 16-18). 
Trump was not blind to the vulnerability felt by the white middle class. In an analysis of 
73 of Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign speeches, Lamont et al. (2017) found that Trump 
specifically and intentionally pandered to the white working class in five major areas: the rural 
work ethic; fear of elites; the dangers of undocumented immigrants, Muslims, and refugees; 
parallels with Black Americans; and the role of working class men as the protectors of women. 
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Appealing to hostile racism and sexism had interesting implications for the Trump coalition 
(Schaffner et al., 2018).   
In 2008 and 2012, the Republican 
presidential candidates (John McCain and 
Mitt Romney, respectively) won the white 
vote by margins of 12 and 20 percentage 
points; in 2016 Donald Trump won the 
white vote by 21 points (Schaffner et al., 
2018; Tesler, 2016; Tyson & Maniam, 
2016). However, while in 2012 Mitt 
Romney won college educated whites by a 
14 point margin and those with less 
education by a 25 point margin, Donald 
Trump only won college educated whites by four points, compared to an astronomical 39 point 
advantage among less-educated white voters (Tyson & Maniam, 2016, Figure 1). Schaffner et al. 
argue that this bifurcation of the white vote is not about education, but about other identity 
differences that tend to line up with education level, such as socioeconomic class, geographic 
location (i.e. urban, suburban, or rural), and, most important, racism and sexism. Reny et al. 
(2019) have theorized that vote switching, the act of voting against the candidate of the party you 
have tended to support, was particularly common in 2016 (p. 92). The study found that the 
primary reason for vote switching in this election was racial and immigration attitudes (p.109). In 
2016, Trump attracted non-college educated voters with his rhetoric of hate while alienating 
some of the college-educated Republican voters. In fact, a common narrative headed into the 
From Tyson and Maniam (2016). Pew Research Center 
 
Figure 1 
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2016 election was that Trump was seriously handicapped by his lack of support among educated 
Republicans and elite members of the Republican party (Borchers, 2016 is one of hundreds of 
such editorials and opinions from the 2016 cycle). However, the #NeverTrump campaign did not 
carry the potency in 2016 that many on the left hoped it would, and the Trump campaign 
effectively mobilized unlikely voters. In fact, in the 2016 election, there were twice as many 
Obama-Trump voters (six million) as there were Romney-Clinton voters (three million) (de la 
Fuente, 2017). Furthermore, an additional six million Trump voters voted in a presidential 
election for the first time (de la Fuente, 2017). That makes a rough total of 12 million Americans 
who voted for Donald Trump not because of party loyalty but because they were drawn into 
politics by his rhetoric, policies, and persona.  
John Farley (2019) found that, while Obama-Obama-Trump voters make up a relatively 
small proportion of the 2016 electorate, they were likely the deciding factor in electing Donald 
Trump. He points to the key often-blue states that Hillary Clinton lost, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 
Iowa, Michigan, and Ohio. These states had the highest number of Obama-Obama-Trump voters. 
Obama-Trump voters are almost entirely white, working class, and non-urban. This mid-western 
region had been particularly hard-hit by the decrease in manufacturing and was thus ripe for 
harvesting feelings of political resentment. Cramer’s disillusioned Wisconsinites (and their 
midwestern brethren) are, mathematically, the reason Trump was able to win. 
Elite Contributions 
 Several high profile Republicans and many lower-level party officials spoke out 
against Donald Trump in 2016 and even indicated that they would not vote for the then-
candidate. Senators McCain, Collins, Murkowski, and Sasse along with Governor Kasich and 
former governors Bush and Romney all refused to endorse Donald Trump (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 
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2018, p. 70). However, not a single one of them endorsed Hillary Clinton. In fact, the only 
Republican to endorse Clinton while in office as a governor, representative, or senator was NY 
congressman Richard Hanna (who was not seeking reelection in 2016). Levitsky and Ziblatt, 
who saw Donald Trump as a dangerous authoritarian capable for shaking American democracy 
to its core, lament the failure of the Republican party to call out the abnormality of Trump. 
Instead, Republican leaders lined up for Trump, acting as if the 2016 election was relatively 
typical. Levitsky and Ziblatt accuse Republican leaders of “normalizing” a national “moment of 
crisis,” resulting in a standard two-party race (p. 70). Republicans knew, of course, that Trump 
would not be a typical president, but their fear of retribution from his intensely loyal base pushed 
Republican higher-ups to grit their teeth and endorse Trump (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 69-72). 
Republicans in the senate have backed their president throughout the Trump presidency, despite 
taking a significant beating in the 2018 midterm elections. While Levitsky and Ziblatt may 
overemphasize the role of elites in their work and underemphasize the growing unrest among the 
electorate, Gabel and Scheve (2007) have found that elites have significant impact on public 
opinion. The behavior of the higher-ups in the Republican party contributed to the electorate’s 
acceptance of the outside candidate. Thus, even if elite behavior around norm enforcement was 
less impactful than Levitsky and Ziblatt propose, by signaling support for Trump, Republicans 
may have swung the election. Concurrently, this elite behavior informs the potency of the Trump 
coalition. As of late 2020, even after Trump lost his reelection campaign, there has been no 
major Republican exodus from the Trump movement. In fact, they continue to support his 
antidemocratic antics as he challenges the legitimacy of the 2020 election (Raju & Zaslov, 2020; 
see also Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 60-61). 
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Some of the scholars’ fears may have come to fruition. In early 2016, when the late 
Justice Antonin Scalia passed away, Republican Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
refused to even hold a hearing for Obama nominee Merrick Garland, signaling the beginning of a 
Republican departure from norms in the Senate (Bravin, 2017). After 293 days, Garland’s 
nomination expired when Trump assumed the presidency. This was certainly a violation of the 
norm, but it was, at the time, conceivable that Republicans were simply establishing a new set of 
norms to follow. When Justice Kennedy retired in 2018, the process for filling the seat followed 
the typical process (of course, the nominee was anything but typical, but as far as norm based 
behavior goes, the Kavanaugh nomination should not have raised concerns). However, when 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (z”l) died on September 18, 2020, the president and Republicans 
began a sprint to confirm a replacement in the six intervening weeks before the election, 
exposing their hypocrisy. One of the greatest fears of Levitsky and Ziblatt is that the president 
would gain a powerful majority on the bench and use it to challenge democratic norms (p. 207). 
Trump has already rejected election results, and it is quite possible that the Supreme Court will 
have a say in the 2020 contest. President Trump may have run an anti-elite campaign, but four 
years later it is clear that his presidency is defined by the permissions of the establishment. The 
Trump coalition is not just the fringe and it is not just the voters. It is an entire political party. 
When elites accepted Trump’s brand of politics, they granted Republican voters permission to 
engage in Trumpism. 
Media 
Francia (2017) has suggested that Donald Trump’s ability to capitalize on free media 
coupled with the media’s obsession with Trump massively advantaged the Trump campaign. 
Trump’s boisterous presence on social media combined with his large Twitter following gave 
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him a platform unmatched by his opponents. His tendency to be crude and unusual made him 
interesting “ratings gold” for traditional media outlets. Even then-host of The Daily Show and 
noted progressive activist, Jon Stewart, celebrated Trump’s candidacy announcement on air in 
2015, expecting a few months of comedic entertainment value. The constant presence of Trump 
on news stations and social media made some of the conventional indicators of electoral success 
less salient. In the end, despite Hillary Clinton’s extensive fundraising and Super-PAC support, 
she was unable to raise enough money to compete with the free media access of Trump (Francia, 
2017).  
The saying “all press is good press” has never been truer than when it is applied to the 
2016 Donald Trump campaign for the presidency. Donald Trump’s most provocative comments 
on the campaign trail tended to be related to immigrants, infamously kicking off his campaign 
with the comment that “[Mexicans are] bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. 
And some, I assume, are good people.” His seemingly absurd rhetoric about immigration 
prompted major U.S. newspapers to write hundreds of pages about his position on the issue, 
unintentionally bringing his views into the mainstream (Oates & Moe, 2016). The media ensured 
that the election became about immigration, Donald Trump, and little else.  
 Perhaps no source of information was more important in establishing the Trump 
coalition than Twitter and Facebook. An avid Tweeter himself, Donald Trump benefitted 
massively from the polarized echo-chamber of social media. Conover et al. (2011) have found 
that “blue check” Twitter timelines tend to be partisan with few connections between users on 
the right and users on the left (something to which any student of politics with a tendency to 
doom scroll can attest). While the authors do find interparty interaction in what they term the 
“mentions network,” this is both unlikely to include dissemination of persuasive information or 
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broad audiences, leaving the majority of eyes and consumption of political information in the 
partisan fray of the verified elites (Conover et al., 2011). Further, Ott (2017) found that political 
twitter is simple, impulsive, and uncivil. In a post-election examination, Ott (2017) remarked on 
the existence of ideological grouping on social media, in which political tweets, news stories, 
and ideas are most likely to reach people who agree with them (p. 65). Ott takes issue with the 
algorithms of Twitter and social media, finding that politics in 280 (or 140) characters is 
responsible for the creation of an irresponsible electorate. From the perspective of the voters, 
however, Trump’s Twitter presence provided a platform for the candidate to speak directly to his 
base in a simple vernacular that they understood. Never before has an American presidential 
campaign been so closely followed or so easy to access.  
Counter-Coalition Building: The Resistance 
 The Trump campaign and subsequent presidency has led to the formulation of a 
counter-coalition of politicians, voters, celebrities, and PACs with little in common except for 
significant dislike for Donald Trump. In the final days leading up to the 2020 election, this group 
includes former Republican aides and strategists, the founders of the Black Lives Matter 
movement, a Silicon Valley PAC with massive financial resources (Schleifer, 2020), and myriad 
former officials from both sides of the political spectrum. The resistance has mobilized millions 
of people for mass protests, such as the Women’s March in early 2017 and The March for our 
Lives in 2018, in its attempt to garner anti-Trump momentum (Fisher et al., 2018). The 
movement, marked by the presence of intersectional identities, stands in stark contrast to the 
racial homogeneity of the Trump coalition. Fisher et al. (2018, p. 460-465) have suggested that 
the movement may fall apart after the end of the Trump days when the common enemy recedes 
from center stage, but there is hope that these bridging relationships that have been built out of 
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necessity will lend themselves to more civil conversations across the aisle (Mason, 2018). More 
importantly, the demographics of the resistance are informative when hoping to understand the 
Trump coalition; understanding those who are not Trump supporters is critical in understanding 
why some people support the president.  
Gaps in Research 
Defining the voter motivation behind the election of Donald Trump is critical to political 
scientists’ understanding of the American political arena. In the wake of an election that 
challenged decades of theory and precedent in the field, the need for clarity in regard to the 
Trump coalition is evident. There has already been a significant amount of research done to this 
end, much of which is represented above; however, there are still areas ripe for further 
exploration. Cramer’s (2016b) work is admirable but is not specifically geared to understanding 
the Trump coalition. Of course, the rural resentment of Wisconsinites is enlightening, but the 
Trump base has adopted national identities into their resentment as well as regional ones. 
Theories from Putnam and Mason describing long-developing national polarization fall short as 
well, for they fail to identify why Trump in particular was able to harness this movement. There 
was clearly a trigger in 2016 that must be explained by more than a slowly developing trend. 
Questions remain about how the candidate himself swayed voter opinion, how members of the 
Trump coalition view one another and their opposition, and why so many moderate Republicans 
(both voters and elites) joined the movement. This study takes a holistic approach to 
understanding the Trump base by both analyzing literature and election results and engaging 
voters in a qualitative survey to understand their feelings about Trump. This study will provide 
an even closer look at the voters behind the 2016 election, a coalition that political scientists 
must understand, as it has permanently changed American politics. 




In order to get at the question of the political identities and beliefs of the Trump coalition, 
I will use both quantitative and qualitative methodology. This study has collected original data 
from voters to come to new conclusions. The most important electoral region in 2016 was the 
Midwest, so my data collection focused on swing districts in the rustbelt. Notably, there are more 
CDs that flipped from Obama to Trump from 2012 to 2016 than in any other region of the 
country. Thus, in partnership with CloudResearch, I have conducted online surveys with 
Midwestern voters in swing districts, a study that I have coined the Midwestern Swing District 
Voter Survey (SDVS). The SDVS includes responses from 82 Trump and Biden voters from two 
key swing districts in the Iowa and Minnesota. Response collection began on Friday, February 
26, 2021 and lasted until Friday, March 12, 2021. The survey asks some basic screener and 
political questions including voter history, but it will focus foremost on a series of open-ended 
questions that drive at respondent’s feelings about Trump and other key political issues1. This 
survey was created as a hybrid. In one regard, it is styled after questions that Cramer (2016) 
asked of voters during her Wisconsin study (p. 233-238). On the other hand, it includes 
quantitative questions like those found in larger and more frequent polls of American voters. The 
data from SDVS allowed for a unique interpersonal comparison between Trump and Biden 
voters. Identity politics is the defining characteristic of voter behavior in 2021 and allowing 
voters to respond without the restriction of multiple choice created a unique opportunity for 
analysis. I worked in consultation with Professor Serena Laws in addition to Dr. Dan Douglas to 
make this research a reality; the Trinity College Political Science Department paid 
CloudResearch $720 for the data collection. 
 
1 The questionnaire is available in PDF form as appendix A 




In order to more fully understand the impact of rural resentment on the politics of today, 
this project will rewind the tape in order to discuss the origins of this complex political identity. I 
will discuss the demographic and economic shifts that have taken place over the past few 
decades in America. There has been decline in the rate of local business ownership, leaving 
shops boarded up in rural towns. Inflation in the late 20th century left farmers in economic 
turmoil, and now there are fewer governmental resources available than ever as the economy 
grows increasingly global and less rural. There are certainly valid complaints and hardships 
confronting rural America, and the next chapter will explain how economic and demographic 
change made this culture the origin of Trumpism. It will go on to explain how, though the 
phenomenon existed before his arrival, Trump has actively and intentionally stoked the 
resentment of rural America to energize his movement. Riding the media wave of Fox News, 
Qanon, One America New Network (OANN), and Twitter and Facebook, Cramer’s rural 
resentment has turned into a somewhat more insidious revitalization of xenophobia, white 
nationalism, and anti-Semitism and Islamophobia that seems to be here to stay.  
Chapter three will dig into the SDVS, analyzing the similarities and differences between 
two voter groups: Trump voters and Biden voters. At the surface level, the survey allows for 
basic analysis of demographic factors. It shows us that, as expected, Trump voters are less 
educated than Biden voters, that the two voter groups are relatively parallel when it comes to 
finances, and that Biden voters are more likely to have strong policy interest than Trump voters. 
It confirms that both sets of voters feel hostility towards the other, revealing a surprising amount 
of hostility towards Trump voters felt by Biden voters. Also in the chapter, I will discuss the 
intense affective candidate loyalty felt by both voter groups.  
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Chapter four will also rely on data from the SDVS, this time focusing on media and 
misinformation, which both loomed large throughout the Trump presidency. The SDVS will 
show that Trump and his fellow Republicans’ “big lie” has had startling salience among voters. 
A plurality of SDVS Trump voters believe that Donald Trump won in 2020, and a vast majority 
of his supporters believe that media has a liberal bias. Contributing to this polarizing and 
troubling trend, right-wing media has become the mouthpiece of Trumpism, pushing lies, 
conspiracy theories, and anti-Democratic party rhetoric that serves only to rile up the base. Even 
in the aftermath of the Trump administration, a plurality of Trump voters still believe that 
Donald Trump won the 2020 election.  
Finally, this project will consider the 2020 presidential election results. Without a doubt, 
this election was primarily a referendum on the Trump presidency. Despite a raging pandemic 
(or, perhaps, because of it), a record breaking number of Americans cast ballots and voted 
convincingly to oust Donald Trump from the White House. Initial exit polling and post-election 
analyses seem to indicate a degree of racial dealignment, meaning a lower proportion of white 
voters and a higher proportion of voters of color broke for Trump in 2020 than in 2016 (Medina, 
2020). This national condemnation of Trumpism is a promising sign, but the election has also 
proven that Trumpism is alive and well. Around 75 million Americans cast their ballots for 
Trump and, considering Trump and his base’s refusal to acknowledge defeat, they are going to 
be here for some time to come. This makes it even more necessary that Democrats, the 
Resistance, and political scientists understand the Trump coalition going forward. 
Conclusion 
 Americans should be scared by Trumpism. White supremacy and anti-Semitism 
have rebounded from the darkest corners of the internet and are once again in the mainstream. As 
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North Korea improves its missile capacities and Iran inches closer to nuclear capability by the 
day, America’s international relationships teeter on the edge of catastrophe (Ward, 2020). Worse 
still, a pandemic has gripped the world and Trump, along with his supporters, have rejected the 
expertise of doctors and scientists, spurning the need for mask-wearing, social distancing, and 
targeted business closures (Baker, 2020). The question in the long-term, however, is not “how do 
we fix these problems?” We must confront the fact that a coalition of Americans felt so badly 
overlooked by politicians, government, and media that they were ready to jump into the erratic 
populism of Donald Trump. It is likely that this movement, which is laced with conspiracy and 
the manipulation of truth, is here to stay. Trump is headed out, but Trumpism may become the 
new Republicanism. Thus, the question we need to be asking is “what is Trumpism, where did it 
come from, and what will it look like going forward?”  
  
Chapter 2 
How Nativist Populism Took Over the GOP 
Donald Trump’s rise to power was and is one of the most monumental events in 
American political history. From the moment he announced his candidacy, the political world 
did not know what to do about Donald Trump’s presence. His primary opponents were stuck 
between stooping to his level to punch back and stubbornly taking the high road while he 
bombarded them with personal attacks ranging from phallic imagery to insults about their 
families. During his time in office, he continued to flout tradition and process, preferring to 
communicate in sound bites and tweets rather than formal addresses and memorandums. He 
consistently engaged in racially charged language, often targeting Latinx immigrants or Hispanic 
Americans, Black Americans, and other foreign nationals (his favorite target being China). In 
short, Donald Trump was nothing like any President America has ever had. His support is 
unprecedented in this country. While the electoral success of Trump came as a surprise to many, 
this chapter will explore how Trumpism was propelled by demographic and political trends in 
America. The Republican base had been shifting for some time, and the arrival of Trump was 
enough to catalyze what may have been an inevitable change. Trump was able to capture that 
potential energy and charged to the forefront of a popular nationalist movement that shook 
American democracy to its core.  
The Republican party has long entertained racially motivated identity politics among its 
ranks. In the 1970s, the Southern Strategy aligned southern Republican support and provided a 
permission structure for racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-elitism (Inwood, 2015). In Ronald 
Reagan’s 1976 reelection campaign, the then-president frequently engaged in race-baiting, 
though he did not engage in the explicit racial rhetoric that has been popularized by the 2016 and 
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2020 contests (Krugman, 2007). For example, in 1980, Reagan spoke of the importance of state’s 
rights at the Neshoba Country Fair in Mississippi, a rallying point for segregationist sentiment. In 
doing so, Reagan signaled acceptance of white supremacist beliefs, beginning a long trend of 
coded Republican acceptance of white supremacy. During Obama’s first term, Republicans 
welcomed the Tea Party into their ranks, a group of right-wingers who much more actively 
embraced the party’s racial undertones than their mainstream counterparts. The movement 
reshaped the GOP, capitalizing on the growing conservative racism and the resentment felt by 
white middle class Americans (Williamson, Skopcol & Coggin, 2011). Tea Partiers emphasized 
the dispossession of white power in America, making racial identity an important factor 
motivating support of the Republican party (Zeskind, 2012). Though no Tea Party candidate ever 
became the Republican Presidential nominee, the GOP underwent significant change during the 
Obama years, setting the stage for an outside presidential candidate willing to speak loudly about 
race to motivate resentful white voters. Republicans began to abandon their dog whistles in 
exchange for their bull horns. Support for Donald Trump cannot be easily explained using 
traditional metrics of American politics. His movement represents an unprecedented change in 
the American landscape, exponentially elevating the prevalence of race, place, and class in our 
national politics. This chapter will further explore the support behind the identity-motivated 
polarization of the Trump movement and the reason that Trump was able to build such an 
impregnable base. 
Rural Resentment 
Scott Walker’s 2010 victory in the Wisconsin g ubernatorial election has become a focal 
point for the political science community, representing a case study of the kind of fundamental 
shift in voting patterns that may have eventually led to the election of Donald Trump. In general, 
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political observers tend to expect voters to support candidates and policies that will bring 
positive change to their lives. For the rural Wisconsinites, this would mean supporting wealth 
redistribution policies and other government programs designed to ease the economic burden on 
the struggling working class. However, Walker, who is a staunch conservative, was able to 
garner support among rural Wisconsin voters despite a policy agenda that threatened to roll back 
benefits for that same group. Katherine Cramer’s (2016) exploration of this phenomenon focused 
on rural resentment as the key explanatory variable, claiming that identity, not policy, was 
driving voter behavior. This chapter extends Cramer’s research, applying her framework to the 
national stage and Trumpism as a whole.  
Of course, there is nothing new about the discovery that rural voters tend to be 
Republicans while urban voters tend to be Democrats, but Cramer found gaps in the literature 
when it came to understanding how the “rural-versus-urban divides function as a perspective 
through which some people think about politics” (p. 53). In an attempt to fill these gaps, Cramer 
suggests that rural American voters hold a set of unique beliefs that makes voting for a 
Republican candidate a logical choice for them. When urban Americans—Democrats—wonder 
why these people would seemingly vote against their own self-interest, they fail to see beyond 
the legislation. Americans are growing increasingly polarized; however, that polarization is not 
driven by policy. Lilliana Mason, in her 2018 book Uncivil Agreement, demonstrates that social 
identity sorting is the root of American polarization. The parties–especially the GOP–have 
become so strongly sorted on identities of race, education, gender, class, and religion that 
Americans feel as if they have no choice but to side with the group that looks and acts like them. 
Figure 1, taken from Mason (2018, p. 97), shows differing anger reactions to political messages. 
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Clearly social sorting, not partisanship or salient political issues, is the most important factor in 
determining anger at the other side. Cross-cutting identities make voters less likely to be angry or 
emotional whereas highly socially sorted Americans are more likely to experience political anger 
(Mason, 2018, p.100).  
While Mason calls it anger, it is easy to see how her findings parallel Cramer’s 
resentment.  Rural voters hold shared beliefs about decision-making power, values and lifestyles, 
and the distribution of resources, 
resulting in a common mistrust of 
government, urban dwellers, and 
outsiders (Cramer, 206, p. 55). Rural 
Americans feel as though they are 
being targeted by unfair tax policy, 
abandoned by globalization, and 
short-changed by government 
programs (Cramer, 2016). Whether 
or not these shared perspectives and 
beliefs, which Cramer coins “rural 
consciousness,” are grounded in fact 
is not relevant to their potency; more 
and more Americans are voting on 
issues of identity. Rural Americans do not only share geographic identity. They are 
overwhelmingly white, older, and struggling financially as the middle class wanes in a changing 
economic environment. This sorted identity is what helps to strengthen and make universal the 
Figure 2 
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themes of rural consciousness; people are biased to look favorably on the ideas of people who 
look, act, and think like them (Mason, 2018). The strength and popularity of this rural 
consciousness has been growing for some time. First, in Wisconsin, it landed Walker in the 
Governor’s Mansion–only a few years later it landed Donald Trump in the White House. The 
growth of rural consciousness has been spurred by changing American demographics and 
economics, and it was further enflamed by the intentional stoking of the Trump campaign, 
culminating in heightened American polarization and the bold reemergence of fringe groups.  
Demographic Change in Rural America 
Understanding the history of rural America is critical to understanding the rural role in 
modern American politics. The trends that were exposed by the 2016 election have been in the 
making for decades.  
The post-war years, from the 1940s through the late 1950s, were something of a golden 
era for white, rural Americans. As white Americans sought property ownership in pursuit of the 
American Dream, rural counties saw population booms (Johnson & Lichter, 2019). In 1940, 75 
million Americans lived in rural municipalities. The American nonmetropolitan population 
began declining in the late 1980s and has continued since. Today, the rural population sits 
somewhere between 45 and 50 million. More dramatically, the proportion of the American 
population living in rural (or non-metropolitan) areas has fallen from 57 to 14 percent (Johnson 
& Lichter). Nearly half of all rural counties have experienced depopulation over that period, 
compared to a mere six percent of metropolitan counties. Johnson and Lichter (2019) offer three 
factors that tend to contribute to depopulation: migration, fertility, and mortality. While there 
have been fluctuations and some down-trends in rural American birth and death rates, the 
majority of the depopulation seen in this demographic can be attributed to net out-migration. 
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That said, the rural population is also generally older and less likely to procreate than the general 
population, driving population even further down. As industry has changed, marked by the 
mechanization of agriculture as well as the automation and exportation of manufacturing, 
employment and business opportunities in rural America began to run dry. Concurrently, demand 
for labor in cities and metropolitan areas grew, driving urban migration among rural Americans 
and discouraging others from moving into the country. This established trend of out-migration 
led, in turn, to a decrease in birth rate and an increase in mortality, as quality of life in rural 
America fell and average age increased over time. In short, depopulation has devastated a 
majority of rural communities, leaving them a shell of what they were fifty years ago.  
Depopulation is a vicious cycle: businesses close because of dwindling profits, leaving 
more people out of work who, in turn, are forced to seek work in suburban or urban centers. This 
leaves the remaining businesses fewer customers, eventually driving them to close as well. 
Johnson and Lichter (2019) have called depopulation a “signature demographic phenomenon” in 
rural America, suggesting that reversal of the trend is unlikely (p. 3). The diminishing population 
and economy in the rural regions of the country comes amidst a new age of urbanization and 
digital revolution that has Americans flocking to the city. Further compounding the rural 
predicament, wage and wealth inequality is at an all-time high, with the top quintile of American 
earners averaging nearly 13 times more income than the bottom quintile (Horowitz, Igielnik & 
Kochar, 2020). As they watch their social and economic status diminish, rural Americans see 
wealth accumulating in cities. Thus, they feel as if their towns are losing out time and time again 
while the urban folks only stand to profit off of rural suffering. Of course, there is also 
significant poverty and inequality within the urban setting. Millions of Americans in cities are 
food insecure, homeless, or live below the poverty line; however, this reality is unimportant 
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when compared to the strength of the illusion of urban prosperity. The resentment built by even 
the appearance of dichotomous economic opportunity and prosperity is politically salient in and 
of itself. One of the Cramer’s central findings is that the accuracy of the rural perception of being 
short-changed by the state is unimportant; the perception itself is what drives the rural identity.   
Cramer (2016) finds that her rural subjects draw a strong correlation between the city 
folks and the state government housed within Madison. Distrust of government is central to rural 
consciousness, as rural Americans tend to blame government for the breakdown of their society. 
As an example, one of Cramer’s interviewees says, 
The cost of the water and sewer here is outrageous compared to what they pay in 
Madison. So here is big rich Madison, with all the good high-paying jobs, getting the 
cheapest water, and we have people up here who have three months of employment . . 
.what are they paying? And I feel like there should be more sharing—less taxes going to 
Madison. (Cramer, 2016, p. 78).  
Expressing a similar frustration, an Iowan Trump voter who responded to the SDVS 
(which will be properly introduced in the next chapter) said that one of the most important 
problems facing him today was that “Taxes are getting out of control.  The country has become 
[too] divided.  We seem to never solve problems.” Rural Americans have come to believe that 
government is not only oversized but is actively making their lives harder with no intention of 
providing relief. Thus, the rural consciousness has developed into an us-versus-them mentality, 
in which rural America is an entity separate from the rest of America, fighting to remain viable 
in an ever-evolving country. As this sense of being left behind has evolved, politicians have 
started rhetorically targeting and encouraging rural distaste for big government. Scott Walker, in 
a 2012 address at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), said, “We are the ones 
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who are looking out for the middle class. Who do you think pays for the endless expansion of 
government? Its middle class taxpayers.” In this intentional framework, they, the Democrats and 
city-dwellers, want to tax the hardworking middle class in order to expand government jobs and 
benefits in urban areas. Similarly, Donald Trump frequently engages in anti-urban rhetoric, 
continuously referring via tweet to “badly run Democrat cities” or “high crime Democrat run 
cities.” In an October 2020 tweet, Trump continued to emphasize the threats of Democratic 
leadership and cities: “Just don’t see any way Nancy Pelosi and Cryin’ Chuck Schumer will be 
willing to do what is right for our great American workers, or our wonderful USA itself . . .Their 
primary focus is BAILING OUT poorly run (and high crime) Democrat cities and states.2” 
Though it is a short tweet, this message is packed with hidden meaning, fear-mongering, and 
dog-whistling. Trump’s message is this: corrupt politicians are going to spend even more money 
on the black and brown people in the cities while ignoring the hard-working white Americans in 
the heartland. In doing so, they will continue to foster hot beds of crime, which will surely spread 
out from the cities and threaten the safety of rural America. Worse still, they are refusing to 
cooperate with immigration enforcement, welcoming in illegal immigrants to take jobs from real 
Americans.3 Donald Trump affirmed that leaders from American cities care little about rural 
America while insisting that he would “Make America Great Again” by restoring rural America 
to its former glory. 
Trump’s rhetoric around race and immigration played off of another demographic shift in 
nonmetropolitan America: the growing minority population. While the absolute population of 
rural America has fallen over the past decades, the Hispanic population in the same areas has 
 
2 In January of 2021, Twitter deactivated Donald Trump’s official Twitter account, an action which included making 
his past tweets unavailable for public viewing. Therefore, this project will rely on secondary compilations and 
archives when referencing Trump tweets. 
3 Trump frequently tweeted misinformation about sanctuary cities, mongering fear of immigrants.   
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increased significantly (Lichter & Johnson, 2020). In fact, Hispanics make up as much as 20 
percent of the population in some areas, tending to immigrate to places with less significant 
population decline. While much of the existing white population of rural America is aging and 
beginning to experience heightened mortality, Hispanic newcomers tend be younger and more 
fertile, making it likely that the Baby Boomer generation will slowly be replaced by a younger 
majority-minority population (Lichter & Johnson, 2020). While this trend is overwhelmingly 
positive for the economic health of rural America, providing an opportunity for recovery to 
rapidly depopulating counties, xenophobia, racism, and bigotry have cast Hispanic migration as a 
threat to “American values,” competitive jobs, and white hegemony. The growing population of 
color in rural America has become a tangible scapegoat for many of the problems facing the 
region.  
Trump Rhetoric and the Racialization of Resentment 
While these demographic trends have been in motion for years and are not new, Trump 
worked actively to increase and elevate xenophobia among his voters. Prior to his rise to political 
saliency, Trump was at the forefront of the birther movement, a racially charged conspiracy 
theory that claimed Barack Obama is a Muslim who was not born in the United States. During 
the 2016 campaign and his presidency, Trump repeatedly emphasized the dangerous nature of 
immigrants of color. Some of his most dangerous quotes are below: 
• “[Mexicans are] bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists, and some, I 
assume, are good people” (A June 2015 event announcing his candidacy) 
• “CHAIN MIGRATION must end now! Some people come in, and they bring their 
whole family with them, who can be truly evil. NOT ACCEPTABLE!” (A 
November 2017 tweet) 
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• “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?...Why do 
we need more Haitians? Take them out” (A 2018 immigration event) 
• “Some people call it an invasion . . .they have violently overrun the Mexican border” 
(Speaking on refugees and asylum seekers at the US-Mexican border) 
Trump played on existing bigotries and phobias to paint a picture of armies of black and 
brown immigrants rapidly approaching American borders, with corrupt Democratic politicians 
waiting to welcome them in with open arms. The rural resentment that Cramer first observed has 
been coaxed into fully fledged racial resentment, leading to historic racial conflict in the Trump 
era. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the correlation between Republican candidate sympathy and racial 
resentment was significantly higher in 2016 than it has ever been since the American National 
Election Study (ANES) began asking racial resentment questions (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019, 
p. 142). Over time, the most racially resentful Americans have been sorted into the Republican 
party, and Trump only served to accelerate that trend (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2019). 
In 1958, English novelist T.H. White wrote that “few people can hate so bitterly and so 
self-righteously as the members of a ruling caste which is being dispossessed.” There is, perhaps, 
no better illustration of this truth than the Trump base. White Americans are, in all likelihood, 
going to lose their status as a majority demographic in America by the year 2045 (Frey, 2018). 
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For the entire history of America, this group has enjoyed unchallenged power, autonomy, and 
control. Since its origin as a slave-based economy, this country has always been a stronghold of 
white power and dominance, and the beneficiaries of that system fear the day when they no 
longer wield hegemonic control. When whites are no longer the majority, power will begin to 
even further disperse across different groups, threatening to bring America closer to being the 
land of opportunity that it has always claimed to be. White rural Americans are afraid of being 
replaced.  
Embracing White Radicalism 
In early August 2017, the now-infamous “Unite the Right” rally took place in 
Charlottesville, Virginia. At the rally, Trump supporters made clear just how worried they were 
about the threat of replacement. They gathered to protest the removal of a Confederate 
monument, wearing “Make America Great Again” hats, holding torches, and engaging in racist, 
anti-Semitic, and Nazi chants, including “Blood and Soil,4” “You will not replace us,5” “Jews 
will not replace us,” and “White Lives Matter” (Lind, 2017). The rally, which resulted in one 
death and several injuries, was a loud, visible example of the reemergence of fringe hate groups 
and militias in the Trump era. In the days following the rally, Trump seemingly endorsed the 
views of the neo-Nazis and white nationalists, refusing to condemn rally-goers outright and 
drawing a moral equivalence between left-wing counter protestors and neo-Nazis, tweeting that 
there were “very fine people on both sides” of the rally (“Trump Twitter Archive”).  
 
4 According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL): [the term ‘Blood and Soil’] was popularized by the Nazi Party 
(as a Hitler Youth slogan and elsewhere). Since World War II, this German phrase has commonly been used by 
white supremacists in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere 
5 According to the ADL: “The slogan [‘You will not replace us’] is a reference to the popular white supremacist 
belief that the white race is in danger of extinction by a rising tide of non-whites who are controlled and manipulated 
by Jews.” 
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Throughout the duration of the Trump era, the president’s masked hints about the fall of 
white economic and social power were accompanied by collaboration and shared goodwill with 
neo-Nazis, the KKK, and other member groups of the alt-right. From the outset of the Trump 
campaign, former KKK Grand Wizard and member of the Louisiana House of Representative 
David Duke was outspoken about his support for Trump (Kessler, 2016). Alt-right political 
strategist Steve Bannon was also a close Trump ally, serving both as campaign director and as a 
Chief Strategist at various points (Hawk, 2019). Donald Trump did more than tolerate the alt-
right and the white nationalists, he actively coveted their support, engaging with their issues and 
offering sympathy to their views. In a presidential debate with then-candidate Joe Biden, Trump 
instructed the Proud Boys, an infamous right-wing militia, to “stand back and stand by,” seeming 
to encourage their support rather than discourage their lawless behavior6 (Ronayne & 
Kunzelman, 2020). Trump’s dangerous flirtation with these offensive fringe groups has had a 
wide range of consequences (including armed insurrection) and has fundamentally altered the 
Republican base and changed the behavior of Trump supporters. By allowing the extremists to 
come into the light, Trumpism normalized less aggressive forms of racism that occur every day. 
“Blue Lives Matter” and Confederate statues and flags, symbols of state brutality against black 
Americans, became regular wardrobe pieces for Trump supporters; racism became an essential 
part of the Trump brand. 
There are obvious consequences of this heightened racial rhetoric: increased presence of 
hate groups, increased hate crimes, and higher incidences of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia 
(Arango, 2020). While the members of these groups make up an incredibly small proportion of 
 
6 Admittedly, there is debate over the true meaning of these remarks, as the context was never clear. What is clear, 
however, is that Trump’s hesitancy to denounce his militant following led to a tragic death on January 6 at the 
capitol. 
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the Trump base, they have a disproportionate amount of influence over the rest of Trump’s 
voters because of their visibility. The latent result of Trump’s behavior towards bigotry is the 
normalization of racism, ableism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. Trump followers chant 
enthusiastically for a defensive wall to be built around Mexico. They laud the administrations 
“Muslim Ban.’ They chant “send her back” in relation to non-white representatives Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortex, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley, and Rashida Tlaib. A large number of Trump 
voters have adopted his language of casual racism, flippantly dismissing the reality of structural 
racism, sexism, and white privilege. Even as American society as a whole has become 
increasingly aware of white privilege, the hardships faced by women and people of color, and 
Islamaphobia since 2016, Trump voters have increased in race-blindness and privilege denying 
over the last four years (Pew Research Center, 2020). In fact, Trump enthusiasts have recently 
grown obsessed with the idea that white conservatives are at risk of being “cancelled” and are 
marginalized for their beliefs. One Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey respondent said the 
biggest issues facing him was “the growing fear that I am being ostracized simply for having 
conservative beliefs. He was one of several Trump voters to express this sentiment. 
From White Exceptionalism to Populist Movement Building 
As the racial undertones of the Trump base have taken hold, Trumpism has evolved into a 
fully-fledged political movement. Trump-hesitant Republicans, like Mitt Romney, Liz Cheney, 
and the late John McCain have expressed concern that the Republican party—and Republican 
voters—have undergone permanent change over the last several years of Trump-laden politics. 
Romney, a senator from Utah, the former governor of Massachusetts, and the 2012 Republican 
Presidential Nominee, has said that, if Trump were to run again in 2024, that he would likely win 
the nomination. He went on to say that he would not support Trump, but “would probably be 
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getting behind somebody who I thought more represented the tiny wing of the Republican Party 
that I represent” (Kaplan, 2021). Romney, who won the 2012 GOP primary in a landslide and 
netted 61 million votes and 206 electors in the general election, has been forced to recognize 
that, in the age of the Trump Republican party, he represents a small minority of his former 
voters (The New York Times, 2012). The Republican party, once the party of Lincoln, has 
become the party of Trump. In fact, on March 8, 2021, nearly two months after he left office, 
Trump released a statement urging his voters to stop donations to the GOP and to donate to his 
“America First” PAC instead (Breuninger, 2021). Trump is aware of the power he holds over the 
Republican party in this political moment; he has clearly won over a fiercer type of support than 
any of his predecessors. 
As the identity-motivated Trump base has grown louder, Trumpism has come to strongly 
resemble a populist movement, engaging in exclusive nationalism, rejecting experts, and 
rejecting democratic norms. One of the most consistent traits of populism is the emergence of 
exclusionary nationalist movements, groups who believe that they are the only true patriots and 
that they alone want what is best for the country. Further, populist groups tend to view their 
opponents as not mere political rivals but enemies of the state (Mounk, 2018).  
As an anecdotal example, in the summer of 2019, I traveled to Arizona for a family 
wedding. In passing, my grandmother, a senior citizen from Albuquerque, NM, mentioned that 
she did not care for Trump. My aunt, a Trump supporter, responded, “Why, do you hate America 
too?”  
In this same vein, one Trump supporting survey respondent described Biden voters as 
either “misinformed or haters of our country.” This idea, that those who stand against the 
movement stand against the country, is a common populist trope. 
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Authoritarian populism also tends to reject elites and experts, seeing them as alternative 
sources of power “who seek to undermine the rightful sovereignty of the common folk” (Oliver 
& Rahn, 2016, p.190). The Trump movement has left no room for ambiguity when it comes to 
elites and experts. Hillary Clinton, who, as a career Democratic politician and a woman, is in the 
Trump base’s target hate demographic, has been the object of hundreds of “Lock her Up!” 
chants. Doctor Anthony Fauci, who has led the federal response to the Covid-19 pandemic, has 
also been the target of MAGA hate, with crowds calling for his termination and Trump 
repeatedly targeting him on Twitter (“Crowd chants fire Fauci,” 2020). Comedian and activist 
Sacha Baron Cohen, disguised as a Trump enthusiast named “Country Steve,” attended a 2020 
right-wing rally, where he convinced attendees to sing along to offensive lyrics about Fauci, 
Clinton, Barack Obama, the WHO, and more, including the lines “Dr. Fauci, what we gonna do? 
Inject him with the Wuhan Flu!” and “The WHO, what we gonna do? Chop ‘em up like the 
Saudi’s do7!” (Baron Cohen & Woliner, 2020). While Cohen is, first and foremost, a comedian, 
the willingness of the crowd to enthusiastically participate in threatening harm against medical 
professionals in the midst of a global pandemic demonstrates the extent of the Trump base’s 
blanket dislike for experts and effortless descension into groupthink. This mob-like behavior in 
Trump crowds motivates the highly sorted identity politics of Trumpism–‘if everyone else like 
me is doing something, it must be ok for me to do it too.’ Of course, the Trump distaste for 
experts, elites, and professionals was not limited to crowds and chants. Trump gutted the 
American bureaucracy, firing career professionals and either replacing them with industry 
executives or leaving crippling vacancies (Lu & Yourish, 2020). 
 
7 A reference to the 2018 Jamal Kashoggi assassination in Saudi Arabia 
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Last, Trump loyalists have demonstrated a willingness to override liberal norms and 
checks and balances in order to serve their purpose. Populists seek to dismantle liberal 
democracy, which lauds protections against factional control, minority rule, and the equal 
distribution of power, preferring instead to cede absolute power to the leader of the movement 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). Populists justify this removal of balances and minority power by 
insisting that the movement represents the general will, and that all dissenting groups must not 
have the national interest in mind. In 2016, Donald Trump laid the groundwork to claim that the 
election was conducted unfairly, suggesting that officials would rig the election in favor of 
Hillary Clinton (Martin & Burns, 2016). Of course, Trump would go on to win that election, but 
he was able to exercise his plan in late 2020, when he repeatedly claimed that, via mail-in voting 
and other voting processes, Joe Biden had been unfairly declared the president-elect. This lie, 
known now as “the big lie,” has done significant and lasting damage to American democracy, 
resulting in millions questioning the legitimacy of the President of the United States and an 
armed insurrection against the United States government. 
Conclusion 
Trumpism has become a team. It has been built from a foundation of resentment and fears 
about an uncertain future, but it now represents a popular nationalist movement focused on racial 
and geographic identity. Trump’s supporters are highly identity sorted, fueling their like-minded 
groupthink and reluctance to challenge or question other team members. As rural America and 
disenchanted white voters fostered growing resentment throughout the 21st century, they grew 
riper and riper for a candidate like Trump. When he burst onto the scene, he fueled their anger 
and offered scapegoats to blame for the decreasing economic and social salience of white 
Americans. While the movement certainly has not rejected extremists, Trump supporters are not 
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all white nationalists, nor are they all populists, but the themes of the Trump brand have spoken 
to underlying insecurities in normal people, spurring them to support the movement. The result 
has been potentially permanent change among the Republican base, the rural electorate, and 
American democracy. The next chapter will break down voter responses to questions of political 
identity, as this project moves closer to understanding the nature of Trumpism in America. 
  
Chapter 3 
Defining Identity Politics in the Age of Trump:  
An Analysis of the Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey 
The previous chapter dove into the theories of Trumpism, using hypothetical reasoning 
and statistical analyses to explain the trends, beliefs, and behaviors that put Trump in office. Of 
course, no national scale dataset will ever be able to define the individual motivations behind 
Trump voters from thousands of towns across the country but defining the movement as a whole 
is a good start. These macro-level data sets leave the question: “who are Trump supporters and 
how can they support him?” Yes, we know they are overwhelmingly white, less educated, and 
male. We also know that they tend to test high on racial resentment scales and are generally 
supportive of anti-democratic behavior. These large data sets, however, are unable to give their 
aggregated respondents a voice. For this project, we set out to create a qualitative profile of the 
Trump voter. Trumpism has left the field of political science scrambling to keep up; the 
movement breaks all of the rules of the discipline. There is no group with which we, as 
academics, are more distanced from than socially conservative Trump enthusiasts. Political 
scientists, civics majors, and, generally, people who spend their time thinking critically and 
theoretically about politics are entirely different than those who only marginally interact with 
politics. We are infatuated with intricacies of policies and minutiae of campaign strategy, 
whereas the common once-every-four-years voter sees only soundbites, memes, and headlines. 
Thus, in order to understand Trumpism, it is critical that the humanity and individuality of the 
Trump voter be recognized as the field begins to pull together Trump post-mortems and attempts 
to rationalize, normalize, and process the last five years of American politics. Playing an equal 
role in the Trump story is the staunch group of Biden voters who were incredibly determined to 
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remove the 45th United States president from office. They too have a group mindset of which the 
following data will create a snapshot. 
Methodology 
In order to gain a better understanding of the motivations behind both Trump supporters 
and Trump detractors, I created a hybrid style questionnaire that emphasizes open response style 
questions, capturing at least a small snapshot of voters’ voices. The questionnaire, known as the 
Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey (SDVS), combines these qualitative inquiries with 
quantitative questions that will help garner an understanding of the political priorities and 
worldviews of respondents. Because I wanted to look at the most consequential voters, I targeted 
congressional districts (CDs) in the Midwest that were won by Obama in 2012 but swung to 
Trump in 2016. There were seven such districts: MN 1, 2, and 8; IA 1, 2, and 3; and WI 3. 
Because department resources were limited, I randomly selected two CDs from this list: MN 2 
and IA 3 from this list. After the random selection of these districts, both happened to be won by 
Joe Biden in 2020, meaning they both went Obama-Obama-Trump-Biden (the same way the 
national elections turned out). I partnered with CloudResearch, a service that pays respondents to 
take surveys online, to distribute the questionnaire. I targeted 80 total completed questionnaires, 
40 from each district equally split between Biden and Trump supporters. Response collection 
began on Friday, February 26, 2021 and lasted until Friday, March 12, 2021. In the end, 82 
respondents completed the survey, including 39 Trump voters, 43 Biden voters, 41 Minnesotans 
and 41 Iowans. Respondents to the SDVS were asked to answer 15 substantive questions, seven 
of which were multiple choice and eight of which called for a text-based open response. The 
median respondent took just over 5.6 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The mean time of 
6.6 minutes to completion is relatively higher than the median, likely due to the questionnaire 
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being left idle in the background while participants multitasked, resulting in some exceedingly 
long interview times. Significantly, SDVS respondents were much more likely to be women than 
men, with 51 women (62 percent) responding compared to only 31 males (38 percent). 
According to Adam Dietrich, a Research manager at CloudResearch who oversaw response 
collection for the SDVS, this breakdown is relatively common for online research, though 
nonetheless important to consider in data analysis. Survey respondents were also almost entirely 
white, with white voters representing nearly 94 percent of respondents. Though this project did 
not set out with the intention of surveying mostly white voters, the demographics of the CDs that 
I surveyed render this hardly surprising: the MN 2nd district and IA 3rd are 83 and 88 percent 
white respectively (2019 ACS). Unfortunately, this will make it effectively impossible to make 
concrete claims about the effect of race on support of Trumpism, but, as Cramer (2016) found, 
these rural white voters are reluctant to talk about race anyway. The whiteness of this sample 
reflects the whiteness of the rustbelt support for Donald Trump.  
Trump voters do not exist in a vacuum; the coalition that elected Trump was answered by 
enthusiastic opposition around the country. Thus, our survey targeted both Trump voters and 
Biden voters, choosing instead to define both in the context of the other rather than attempting to 
draw conclusions about Trumpism without an anchoring comparison. Our questionnaire, which 
is attached as appendix A, had two central goals: establish the respondent’s self-conceptualized 
political and social identity and gather enough data to make generalized statements about certain 
voter groups. In early conceptualizations of this research, I had hoped to reach a large number of 
voters who engaged in vote switching or party disloyalty—people who voted for Obama in 2012 
and then Trump in 2016 or those who went Romney in 2012 and then Clinton in 2016. I figured 
that by targeting swing districts that went heavily for Trump in 2016 I would be able to collect at 
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least some information or written responses from these people who were direct examples of the 
power of the Trump message. This, however, was more difficult that I had imagined. Of the 113 
total entrants to my questionnaire, only four indicated that they switched parties from 2016 to 
2020 and, of those, only two switched from voting for Hillary Clinton to voting for Donald 
Trump.  
Hoping to capture voter attitudes that binary variables and sliding scales are unable to 
approximate, the questionnaire solicits a fair amount of free-response, text-based answers. These 
answers are intended to give the respondents an opportunity to express their voices independent 
of the options provided by a multiple-choice answer. In presenting the results of this survey, I 
will offer both graphics and statistical analyses of quantitative data as well as excerpts from 
respondent text-entry questions.  
Findings 
This project has, to this point, emphasized the importance of identity politics and social 
sorting in the age of Trump. Understanding the demographics of Trumpism is only a cautious 
first step towards gaining insight into the Trump-voter mindset. This section will start by 
presenting the demographics and political leanings of the SDVS sample and will progress to 
analysis of the issues and identities that hold together the Trump coalition and their rivals. Of 
course, this project’s sample was limited to the Midwest, so any firm conclusions generalized out 
to the greater United States are based in conjecture; however, as Cramer (2016) has 
demonstrated through her exposure of the motivations of the resentful rural class, the 
nationalization of politics has minimized regional differences in political identity. Thus, the 
SDVS data does help us understand the Trumpism mindset at a national level. 
Class and Education 
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Demographics are the first step of social sorting. Socioeconomic class and education 
disparities between Trump voters and Biden voters is one of the most common explanations for 
the rise of Trumpism. Recall that an earlier chapter of this work discussed at length Trump’s 
unusually high numbers among voters without college degrees in 2016, taking the demographic 
by 39 points compared to the 25 point received by Romney just four years earlier (Tyson & 
Maniam, 2016). Political scientists such as Cramer, Mason, and Tesler have demonstrated that 
lower socioeconomic class is correlated with support for Trump, with Cramer (2016) specifically 
claiming that working and lower class Americans from rural America share a common 
consciousness of resentment towards the urban liberal elite. The SDVS asked about these key 
demographics, allowing for a quantitative analysis of a midwestern sample’s education and 
class-based breakdown. While these indicators of identity are essential to understanding the 
Trump coalition, the SDVS also gave voters an open-ended opportunity to discuss their 
identities. One of the focuses of the survey was to attain a non-numerical definition of Trump 
voters, and this question, “In this survey, we are interested in hearing from real people about how 
they see themselves and the issues that matter to them. To start, how would you describe yourself 
to someone you had never met before? Please answer in a couple sentences,” is integral to this 
goal.  
 Figure 1 is a representation of how Biden and Trump self-identified their socioeconomic 
class8. Biden voters were about seven percentage points more likely to identify as working class 
than Trump voters while Trump voters were about nine percentage points more likely to self-
identify as middle class. Of course, this is inconsistent with the image of the blue-collar, 
agricultural, rural Trump base; however, one has to bear in mind that the traditional Republican 
 
8 All figures and data presented in this chapter are derived from the Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey 
responses unless explicitly indicated otherwise. Raw SDVS data is available upon request 
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base, while sharing a great deal 
with the Trump base, represents 
a great deal of upper-middle 
class suburbanites who are far 
less vocal about their support for 
Trump. All of that said, survey 
respondents are historically 
unreliable in their self-
assessment of social class. 
Americans want to believe that they are part of the elusive middle class, and thus a 
disproportionate number of Americans think of themselves as either middle class or working 
class. Tellingly, the SDVS question included an option for respondents to select “upper class” 
but not a single one of the 82 respondents chose to identify as such. To put these numbers in 
perspective, a Gallup longitudinal study that has run since 2008 finds that as many as 58% of 
Americans typically identify as middle class (Newport, 2016). The SDVS Trump voter sample, 
therefore, is slightly more likely to identify as Middle class than the national average, though by 
a small margin with no statistical significance. Perhaps the anti-elitism of Trump rhetoric turns 
Trump voters away from identifying as upper class and the emphasis on American 
exceptionalism and the successful Trump economy encourages those on the borderline between 
working class and middle class to choose the latter. The Biden voters captured by the SDVS 
were also more likely to identify as middle class than as any other social class but were spread 
more evenly between middle and working class.  
Figure 3 
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More reliable than self-reported class, however, is household income. Figure 4 shows that 
the actual (reported) incomes of survey respondents do not necessarily line up with their class 
identification. Thirty percent of respondents made less than $50,000 per year. Of those, six report 
making less than $25,000 per year, which, according to a 2018 Pew study, certainly qualifies as 
lower class (Kochhar, 2018). The others, who make between $25,000 and $50,000 per year, may 
also be considered lower class if there are more than two people in their household. Considering 
only three total respondents self-identified as lower-class, it is obvious that there is social stigma 
bias occurring when it comes to self-reporting social class, seeing as at least six and as many as 
25 respondents’ incomes could qualify as lower class. On the flip side of the scale, 38 percent of 
respondents reported incomes of $100,000 or more, including 20 percent (16 individuals) of total 
respondents who reported making over $125,000 per year. In households with one or two 
members, earners of $100,000 
or more are likely to be 
considered upper class; in 
households of three or more, 
earners of $125,000 or more 
may qualify as upper class. 
While the CDVS does not ask 
respondents to report the 
number of people in their 
household, it is clear that a non-zero number of respondents qualify as upper class, contrary to 
their self-reporting.  
Figure 4 
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Figure 4 does more than simply tell us that our respondents have a faulty sense of their 
social class; it tells us that, financially, there is relatively little financial difference between 
Trump voters and Biden voters in the SDVS. Yes, there are more Trump voters in the $100,000 
and more club by about 11 percentage points and there are more Biden voters making between 
$50,000 and $99,999 than Trump voters by about 11 points, but the biggest takeaway from this 
figure is that, in the SDVS, both voter groups have a fairly even distribution of incomes. Trump 
and Biden voters earn a diverse set of incomes and their social class identity is impacted more by 
social desirability than by their actual financial situation. This may be an area where the 
geographic limitations of the SDVS are exposed. This sample pulls from two individual CDs, 
and it stands to reason that people who live near each other have similar incomes. The SDVS 
does not allow for analysis of, for example, rural versus urban incomes or average incomes in 
Trump versus Biden CDs. In fact, in 2017, Republican CDs had a median household income of 
$53,000 compared to $61,000 in Democratic CDs (Muro & Whiton, 2019). However, when 
analyzing the intra-district identity-based difference between the SDVS voter groups, income 
seems to play a relatively minor role.  
Education is another indicator of social class, and perhaps a more objective indicator than 
household finances or socioeconomic class. Cramer’s (2016) rural consciousness is motivated, in 
large part, by resentment of universities and people with university educations. Cramer finds that 
universities, especially state universities supported by taxpayer dollars, hold a “symbolic place” 
in rural perception of power and decision making (34). These are the institutions in which future 
leaders are indoctrinated with the elite attitudes that lead to the subversion of rural communities 
and the preferential treatment given to urban centers.  Education is the demographic in the SDVS 
that reveals the greatest difference between voter groups (Figure 5). Biden voters were more 
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likely to have a bachelor’s degree or higher than Trump voters by 18 percentage points. Trump 
voters were twice as likely as Biden voters to have no education beyond high school and three 
times more likely to have earned an associate’s degree but not a bachelor’s degree. Though the 
base size of voters with graduate degrees was less than ten, Biden voters were more likely to 
have advanced degrees than Trump voters. Mirroring the national trend, SDVS respondents who 
voted for Joe Biden in 2020 were more educated than those who voted for Donald Trump. This 
pairs well with the Grossman and Hopkins (2016) theory around asymmetric polarization. The 
Democratic party is host to a wide array of groups each with different issue focuses, so it stands 
to reason that more 
educated people would 
gravitate to a party that 
prioritizes policy 
making. Republicans, 
on the other hand, are 
not policy oriented and 
are brought together by 
affective identity 
sorting; one of the identities that they sort on is education. In this conceptualization of identity 
politics, being a part of the “true America” means not attending college, working hard in a blue 
collar or working class position, and rejecting the elites who fail to comply with these standards 
as un-American and oppositional.  
These data leave an unsatisfactory gap between education and income; generally, 
scholars and political observers have correlated both education and income with social class. A 
Figure 5 
Arnold    
 
48 
new study of the 2016 Trump electorate from Carnes and Lupu (2021) has found that, while 
Trump made gains among the less-educated working class, the “working class” and 
“uneducated” voters that Trump attracts are high-income compared to the typical working class. 
Perhaps best demonstrated by the high rates of associate’s degrees observed among Trump 
voters in the SDVS, the working class Trump voter tends to make a better income than the 
working class Biden voter. The authors write, “Trump support [in 2016] was actually higher 
among affluent people without college degrees than among lower-income people without college 
degrees . . .Although the “education gap” reached historic levels in 2016, this phenomenon was 
driven largely by more affluent Americans” (Carnes & Lupu, 2021, appendix II, p. 8). I concur 
with Carnes and Lupu that, considering this and other data around Trump voters, subjective class 
identity is likely more indicative of voter behavior and political identity than the traditional 
demographic metrics of social science.   
Figure 6 
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Bearing in mind the undeniable relevance of subjective identity, the SDVS’ most 
important demographic measure may be the open-response identity question. Figure 6 is a 
quantitative representation of the open-responses, which have been grouped by response type.9 In 
order to create this visual, I went through each response and simply counted which of eight 
attributes respondents noted about themselves. These attributes, religion, family, work, positive 
personal traits, negative personal traits, demographic identity10, political identity, and prosocial 
or empathetic tendency, were selected because they were the most common among respondents. 
Unsurprisingly, respondents who voted for Trump were far more likely (16 percentage points) 
than those who voted for Biden to reference their religion in their response, with 18% or nearly a 
fifth of voters in this group referencing religion. These responses ranged from the curt 
“Christian,” which was one respondent’s entire answer, to the more elaborate, “I am a loving and 
caring mother and wife. I have a strong faith in Christ and this belief impacts my daily outlook 
and actions. I also am a hard worker and my values are very important to me.” Religion is central 
to the Republican identity; Trump, who has proven himself to not be a particularly religious 
person, has made a concerted effort during his political career to court the religious right. The 
respondent quoted above is not unusual in her pride in the shared values of Christianity, it is one 
of the points of social sorting over which Republican voters have come together. For several who 
mention Christianity, it is not a point of emphasis, but more of an afterthought, an obvious 
addition to their identity: “I am an encouraging, garden-loving Christian.” Another respondent 
says, “I am humble, honest to a fault. Religious.” They are proud of holding this in-group 
identity. As a point of contrast, the single Biden voter who mentioned religion wrote “I’m an 
 
9 The sum of percentages will exceed 100% because multiple attribute mentions were counted for each response  
10 Responses were deemed to include a demographic identity whenever the respondent mentioned their age, gender, 
sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, or disability status. Religion was intentionally excluded from this category—any 
mention of religion was grouped in with the religion category. 
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Irish Catholic lesbian liberal feminist qoman,” identifying herself as part of a minority religious 
group rather than using the term Christian. 
Both Trump voters and Biden voters were more likely to identify themselves based on 
their familial status or relationships than based on their religion, but Trump voters were nine 
percentage points more likely to do so than Biden voters. Trump voters believe in the 
preservation of the American family structure and worry that liberalism is a threat to dismantle 
the family institution (Brewer, 2020). Thus, signaling support for family values and the nuclear 
family structure is a logical method for indicating identity as a Trump supporter. In this vein, one 
Trump voter responds, “I’m . . .a father, husband, son, brother and friend.” Two other Trump-
voting women write, “I am married with two children and two grandchildren” and “I am a loving 
and caring mother and wife.” Biden voters seem less likely to primarily define themselves based 
on their family. One woman writes “I am an attorney who is a mom of three;” another man 
writes “I am a 50 year old white divorced male. I am a father of two girls and a federal 
employee.” Notice how both Biden voters quoted above list a primary identity before they reveal 
their family status (one mentions her employment status and the other mentions his age and 
race), whereas all three Trump voters lead with their family identity. Family, while important to 
all voters, is an emphasized more strongly as an identity by Trump supporters than Biden voters. 
Biden voters are more likely than Trump voters to identify themselves based on a 
demographic trait or their political and ideological leanings than Trump voters. This is likely a 
reflection of two things: first, Biden voters are more likely to be from minority or marginalized 
groups than Trump voters. Second, part of the identity of Democratic voters is awareness of 
privilege and expanded rights for minority groups; voters who understand the role that 
demographic identity traits play in the American political and justice systems are more likely to 
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think about their own demographic traits. To the former point, one woman who voted for Trump 
wrote, “I'm a college junior at the University of Iowa. I'm Indian (Asian) and proud to be.” To 
the latter point, another woman responded, “I am a liberal, white female who loves to learn, read, 
play video games and garden.” While “white” is not a point of emphasis, this respondent is 
signaling that she is “woke” about race by including her racial demographic in her identity even 
if she is a member of the dominant racial group. Related to this idea of woke culture is the fact 
that Democrats were 20 percentage points more likely to indicate empathy towards others or 
prosocial traits that encourage positive social interaction. These responses trended along the lines 
of, “I would describe myself as non-judgmental and friendly to get along with. I enjoy being 
around people and getting to know other people.” Another respondent “strives to find ways to 
give back to those around me.” The Trump mantra of America first has bled into a self-first 
ideology; just consider that Trumpists refused to wear masks as a symbolic protest despite the 
scientific evidence that masks protect both the wearer and those around her from COVID-19. 
Biden voters, on the other hand, seem to have identities built around positive interactions with 
and lending help to others. 
Relatively few voters indicated political leanings in their open response identity answers, 
but Biden voters were about nine percentage points more likely to do so than Trump respondents. 
Trump voters whose responses indicated political leanings tended to simply note that they are 
“conservative.” While a couple of Biden voters did refer to themselves as “liberal,” others used 
the phrases “activist,” “social justice,” “human rights,” and “healthcare, education, and student 
loan debt.” Once again, the SDVS respondents prove that the Biden voters and Democrats in 
general are a diverse group of policy-interested individuals loosely bonded over party 
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polarization whereas Republicans are, in general far less interested in ideology and party than 
they are in identity. 
While the SDVS is not a perfect reflection of the nation and is bound to have Midwestern 
influences, the identities of the Trump and Biden voters responding to the survey fall in perfectly 
with the hypothesized outcome. Trump voters are focused on family values, religion, and identity 
politics; the Biden voters are focused on ousting Trump, achieving policy change, and virtue 
signaling woke culture. The next section will explore how the two voter groups feel about each 
other. 
Feelings Toward the Other Side 
Another defining marker of Trumpism is the visceral language of polarization that Trump 
and his supporters have engaged in since mid-2015. From “lock her up” to “own the libs,” 
Trump supporters have made clear their disdain for the other side. Mason (2018) makes clear 
that the United States is in a moment of intense intraparty unity and interparty hostility. Because 
of this Trump era polarization around race, class, gender, and immigration, I expected to see 
quite plainly the ugly side of Trumpism reflected in the open-responses about the other side. My 
hypothesis was that Trump voters would have much more negative views of Biden voters than 
Biden voters have of Trump voters. This did not turn out to be the case. 
 Respondents were asked, “We live in a polarized time in which people have 
disagreements with each other. How do you feel about [Donald Trump’s/Joe Biden’s]11 
supporters?” I hypothesized that Trump voters would have highly negative views of Biden 
supporters, referring to them as un-American communists intent on destroying the America they 
know and love. Similarly, I expected Biden voters to see Trump’s supporters as uneducated 
 
11 Question text piped in the 2016 presidential candidate that the respondent did NOT vote for (e.g. a Biden voter 
would have been asked about her feelings towards Trump supporters).  
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racists obsessed with maintaining the social power of white America. While hostility was 
anticipated from both voter sets, I expected greater negativity from Trump supporters than Biden 
supporters towards their political opponents. In order to compare the two voter groups responses 
to each other, I created an attribute scale on which I evaluated each individual response (figure 
7). After going through the responses, I identified the six most common feelings expressed 
towards the opposition. The least hostile beliefs about opposing voters, those expressing respect 
for the other side, are on the far left of the x-axis. The most hostile, those expressing the belief 
that voters on the other side are brainwashed cult members, are on the far right of the x-axis. This 
scale is far from perfect and far from linear, but it should offer a loose visualization of the 
relative warmth or coolness that Trump and Biden voters feel towards one another. 
 The data tells a different story than I expected. In this graph, I see that Trump 
voters were far more likely to attribute the least hostile attributes to Biden voters, with 28 percent 
of Trump voter’s indicating respect for Biden voters while only 12 percent of Biden voters 
Figure 7 
Relative Hostility 
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indicated the same for Trump voters. These responses are along the lines of this example from a 
white woman from Iowa who voted for Trump: “I am totally okay with them. I don’t think I 
should classify people based on who they support. Just because someone voted for someone 
doesn’t mean they agree with everything that person stands for.”  
 On the flip side, over half of Biden voters called Trump voters wrong, misguided, 
or stupid, with another 23 percent indicating that Trump voters are either extremist or members 
of a cult. One respondent wrote, “I feel that the Donald Trump clan is almost like a cult. They 
follow him blindly with no morality,” calling attention to the groupthink that dictates the 
behavior of Trump voters. Another Biden voter said, “They live in a Matrix of their own 
choosing; they have taken a red pill that confirms all their biases and ignores “alternative facts” 
that refute them.  I liken them to someone who has been brainwashed by a cult group.” It might 
be tempting to look at this graph and these responses and come away with the conclusion that 
Biden voters have greater hostility towards Trump voters than Trump voters do towards Biden 
voters, but there may be another story here. Trump voters were nearly four times more likely to 
feel that their opponents are unaccepting or disrespectful of their views than Biden voters. In the 
late months of 2020 and the early months of 2021, the Republican party has successful 
emphasized the opposition of cancel culture in their platform. These responses may suggest that 
this message and those about Republicans being denied first amendment rights have taken hold 
with the Trump voter base. Trump voter’s hostility towards Biden voters, therefore, may be 
being channeled into this avenue, in which Trump voters feel disrespected or silenced by people 
who they associate with Biden voters. Furthermore, they may be expressing respect for their 
opponents, as shown above, as a nod to this anti-cancel culture obsession. Take this response, 
offered by another white female Trump supporter from Iowa, for example: “I respect them and 
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their beliefs. I would expect the same in return.” This quid pro quo formulation suggests that 
Trump voters are not, in fact, more empathetic towards their opponents than Biden voters, but 
rather express their hostility differently.  
 The above being said, the open hostility that I expected to see from this question 
is most certainly present. One of the following two responses comes from a Trump voter and the 
other from a Biden voter. They are impossible to distinguish after the candidates’ names are 
removed: 
• They are either imbeciles that can’t think for themselves or people 
willfully trying to destroy the country. Not sure which is worse. 
• I don't like to generalize, but a majority of Trump supporters refuse to see 
truth and only listen to what Trump and his allies present them. 
Both of these quotes were coded into the “wrong/stupid/misguided” category, and they 
clearly represent hostility towards the political opposition. Fascinatingly, there is often little 
difference between the hostile language used by Trump supporters and that used by Biden 
supporters. Response number one (1) above is a from a Trump supporter while response two (2) 
is from a Biden supporter, but there is nothing about them (short of Trump’s name, which I 
blacked out), to indicate this. While the polarization of the Trump era is stark, it is not limited to 
the Trump base. Biden supporters hold similar hostile feelings towards Trump supporters. It is 
important to note once more that nearly every respondent in this dataset is white, so while there 
is certainly racially motivated hostility in the current political climate, these responses are devoid 
of such rhetoric. 
Most Important Political Issues 
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The central quantitative section of the SDVS was a ranked choice question which asked 
respondents to rate twelve political issues on a scale of one to five, where one represented “not at 
all important” and five represented “Extremely important.” These political issues were not 
chosen at random. The Pew Research Center, in partnership with Ipsos, has conducted a survey 
called “The American Trends Panel” (ATP) since 2014. The questionnaire, which asks a number 
of questions about political candidates and voter preferences, also asks about political issues. I 
chose to mirror the issues that the ATP asks about so that I would have a larger database to 
compare results to (please see the full SDVS questionnaire text appended). These issues, which 
are attached in the appendix and are also depicted in figure 8 are national and widely discussed 
in the political world. As such, I hypothesized that my sample would not deviate largely from 
national trends, especially once disaggregated by party.  
The data, as predicted, do not deviate heavily from the Pew findings; however, there are 
some differences between the two samples that are worth pointing out. The ATP survey found a 
Figure 8 
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nearly 30 point spread between Democrats and 
Republicans in how frequently they rated 
“violent crime” as “very important to their 
vote in the 2020 presidential election.” 
Respondents to my questionnaire in Iowa and 
Minnesota, when asked how important 
“violent crime” is to them, had a much tighter 
spread, with only nine points separating 
Trump and Biden voters who rated “violent 
crime” as either “very important” or 
“extremely important.” The reason for this 
divergence could be attributed to several 
possible factors. First, it is possible that the wave of post-election violence in late 2020 and early 
2021 that was largely carried out by Trump supporters made Biden supporters more likely to rate 
violent crime as important. Second, the Pew data wave shown here was collected over the 
summer of 2020, when the protests and rallies in the wake of the George Floyd and Briana 
Taylor police brutality incident were at their height. It seems likely that the partisan divide over 
violent crime would have been elevated at a time where police were under scrutiny as aggressors 
by Democrats and Republicans worried that the Democrats would let the violent mob destroy the 
country. Lastly, the whiteness of the midwestern sample is again relevant. Support for police and 
consternation about community violence and criminals have become political dog whistles for 
race. Drakulich et al. (2020) have found that, for those with high levels of racial resentment, 
support for police and votes for Trump are correlated. Nationally, Democrats tend to be far less 
Figure 9 
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white than Republicans; however, in this sample, 40 of 43 Biden voters are white. Thus, the 
relatively high concern with violent crime among Biden voters in the SDVS as compared to the 
ATP panel may be indicative of lower attentiveness to and concern about racial violence than the 
average national Biden voter. 
There is another discontinuity with the ATP panel on the issue of immigration. The Pew 
panel finds a 15 point difference between Biden voters and Trump voters on the importance of 
immigration, with Trump voters being significantly more likely to describe immigration as 
important than Biden voters. In the survey of Iowans and Minnesotans, there was a two 
percentage point difference in the opposite direction. Because these questions are not phrased 
with partisan tilt, these data do not display relative polarization around an issue. Trump voters 
are likely responding to “immigration” with negative images and headlines of Latinx immigrants 
crossing the border illegally. Biden voters, on the other hand, likely consider immigration reform 
when rating the importance of the political issue. What I know is that, in this survey data, when 
compared to the ATP, Republican voters found immigration to be relatively less important 
and/or Democrats found immigration to be relatively more important. One explanation for this 
may be the highly public debate around immigration; Democrats in recent years have come out 
strongly in favor of humanitarian immigration enforcement, making it an issue Democratic 
voters care more about. 
While these deviations from a relatively normative data set provide some insight into the 
individuality of my sample, there are lessons to be learned from those trends that reflect the 
national data as well. I found statistically significant difference between voter groups in the 
relative importance of healthcare, the COVID-19 pandemic, gun policy, economic inequality, 
and climate. In general, these numbers do not indicate partisanship or the position that a 
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respondent takes on the issue, but rather they represent how much an individual cares about 
them. With the possible exceptions of the COVID-1912 pandemic or economic inequality, these 
issue are not presented with partisan tilt. In other words, when responding, a pro-life activist and 
a pro-choice activist would both rate “abortion” as highly important. Thus, these results do not 
suggest strong policy-based polarization between voter groups, but rather reflect the asymmetric 
polarization that pervades the American political system.  
The Democratic party, which is an amalgamation of policy-oriented activist groups, 
issue-driven voters, and ideological liberals. The party has refused to adopt a unifying ideology 
and has instead focused on technical, policy-oriented leadership as a strategy for courting voters 
from various groups (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016, pp. 100-102). On the other hand, the 
Republican party is made up of three distinct groups: egalitarian fundamentalists and social 
conservatives, libertarians and neoliberal budget hawks, and national security-obsessed America-
first patriots. This “three-legged” stool is united by the Republican party under the umbrella 
ideology of conservatism. Because these groups have such vastly different policy goals, the 
Republican party is far less policy oriented and far more identity-oriented than their Democratic 
counterparts (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016). Thus, the disparity in the self-evaluated importance 
of key issues between voter groups can be, in part, attributed to the tendency for Democratic 
voters (in this case, Biden voters) to care far more about policy than Republican (Trump) voters, 
who are more interested in identity. Trump voters are, perhaps, the most strongly culturally 
polarized voter group in American history, while the resistance, the anti-Trump Democratic 
coalition, rallies around policy. While the goal of this project is to understand what motivated 
 
12 While science leaves little room for debate about the vital importance of the COVID-19 pandemic, in the early 
months of the crisis and throughout, Republicans and Donald Trump minimized the seriousness of the virus and 
politicized the response to it. Thus, seeing COVID as an important or unimportant issue is likely reflective of 
partisan identity.    
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support for the untraditional candidate Trump, it is important to remember throughout this 
chapter that the strongest predictor of a Trump vote was membership in the Republican party. 
The majority of his voters would have voted for anyone with an (R) next to their name on the 
ballot. This question, therefore, is why traditional Republicans so easily came over to the Trump 
brand and how he inspired enough turnout among unlikely voters to win an election.  
Affective Loyalty to Candidate 
 Throughout Donald Trump’s presidency, his approval rating stayed remarkably constant, 
tending to fluctuate up or down 5 
percentage points from an average of 41 
percent approval (Gallup13, 2021). Trump 
boasted an intraparty approval rating that, 
typically, ranged from the high 80s into 
the low 90s (Gallup, 2021). In the first 
months of his presidency, Joe Biden has averaged 56% approval, including 94% intraparty 
approval. Trump and Biden voters in Minnesota and Iowa were also asked a Trump approval 
question. Of course, the SDVS was conducted in the weeks and months following the end of 
Donald Trump’s tenure as president, so this is a feel about Trump’s job performance in the wake 
of the election, these results may very well be obfuscated by the insurgence at the capitol and 
some of the other lame duck happenstances of the Trump presidency. Questionnaire respondents 
did not evaluate Donald Trump’s job particularly different than the national Gallup survey, 
though the 82 percent approval among Trump voters indicated by figure 8 is slightly lower than 
 
13 These numbers come from an archive of Gallup’s weekly approval polls, which are conducted entirely via 
telephone. While individual Gallup polls have a slightly higher margin of error than larger polls, the frequency of 
their interviews make Gallup presidential approval polls a good tool for tracking approval over time. 
Figure 10 
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Trump’s average intraparty approval during his time in office. That said, the overwhelming 
majority of responding Trump voters continue to approve of Trump’s administration despite the 
relatively disastrous final year and months of his term, which saw a devastating pandemic and a 
Trump-supported armed attack on 
the United States government. 
While these numbers 
seem to confirm that Trump’s 
voters are remarkably loyal and 
that his opponents are put off by 
his antics, approval rating alone 
does not give us a complete sense 
of how voters view their 
candidate. Hoping to get at a 
more affective, identity based assessment of how Trump and Biden voters viewed their 
candidate, I asked respondents two questions, one qualitative and one quantitative. First, they 
were asked “Why did you vote for your candidate,” and asked to respond in open-response 
format. Then, they were asked “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: [my 
candidate] cares about people like me?” For this question, they were given a 5-point agree-
disagree scale on which to respond.  
While the difference between Trump and Biden voters’ assessment of their candidates’ 
attitude towards them is not statistically significant, these data do suggest that nearly one out of 
five Trump voters (which, if generalized out to the electorate as a whole, represents about 15 
million people) do not believe that Donald Trump cares about them. It is tempting, then, to 
Figure 11 
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ascribe policy motivation to these voters, to believe that they reason they voted for someone who 
cared so little about them was because he stood for an ideology or style of governance that they 
believed in. However, American voters are generally not ideologically focused or policy-driven, 
lining up far more predictably on social issues and geographic, demographic, and religious 
identity (Mason, 2018). In fact, only four Trump-voting respondents named a specific policy 
concern when explaining their vote for Trump, all four of whom expressed concern about 
abortion policy. It is fair to guess, therefore, that this 20 percent of Trump voters who disapprove 
of Trump’s job performance but remain loyal at the ballot box are members of social groups that 
identify with the Republican party, voting out of loyalty to their team more so than loyalty to the 
candidate.  
This type of voter is typical within the American political system and is in stark contrast 
to the populist-like loyalty observed in much of the Trump base. One unenthused Trump voter 
wrote “I tend toward more Republican beliefs although [I] wasn’t overly happy with the choice 
available.” This is the perfect snapshot of the Republican voter who is not particularly motivated 
by policy or ideology but is a Republican by identity and voted for Trump to help the team win. 
Contrast this response with an enthusiastic Trump voter: “He is actually trying to do good things 
for the country.” Another voter who better embodies the Trump persona wrote,  
Joe Biden is senile . . .However, even thought that is one heck of a reason not to vote for 
Biden, I wanted Donald Trump to continue his work on making AMERICA GREAT and 
AMERICAN CITIZENS FIRST. Joe Biden's mental condition makes me sad but it is 
TRUE! 
Of course, Trump voters are a diverse set of Americans, and here it is clear that there is a 
significant difference between reluctant Trump voters and those who fully embraced Trump’s 
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message and movement. That being said, even these most enthusiastic Trump voters still tend not 
to zero in on policy issues when speaking about the reason for their support of Trump. They do 
not respond, for example, “I am excited by Donald Trump’s protectionist trade agenda because I 
am concerned by globalization” or “Donald Trump will push a restrictive immigration policy and 
I am worried about the erosion of American culture.” Trump voters are motivated by identity. 
Biden voters are situated differently, though there remain stark similarities. Similar to 
Trump voters, only five respondents named specific policy motivations for support of Donald 
Trump. The majority of these responses indicated concern for women’s rights, minority group 
rights, and access to reproductive healthcare (abortion rights). Recall that abortion was also the 
most common policy issue brought up by Trump voters. Further, Biden was rated similar by his 
supporters when it comes to their evaluation of how their candidate feels about them, scoring a 
mere nine percentage points higher than Trump. One remarkable difference between the two 
voter groups is the frequency with which they mentioned the opposing candidate when justifying 
their vote. Of the 39 Trump voters surveyed, a mere seven respondents, or 18 percent, referenced 
Joe Biden when asked to explain why they voted for Donald Trump. On the other hand, 27 Biden 
voters (64 percent) said that they were at least somewhat motivated by voting against Donald 
Trump. Clearly, Biden voters were heavily motivated by disdain for Trump and Trump voters. 
While this is a different source of motivation than what Trump voters felt, it still represents 
identity-motivated voter behavior. In their self-reporting, Biden voters do not emphasize policy 
or ideology, but the identity of the opposition. Voters coming together to vote against a common 
opponent, while an entirely different process than the social sorting of Trumpism, is also an 
identity-based movement. There could and maybe should be concern among Democrats about 
what this means for their alliance that beat Trump, for in the absence of a common enemy and 
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the identity of the resistance, there is even less holding together the Democratic coalition. From 
Mason’s (2018) perspective, Democratic diversity is positive and reduces social sorting. People 
sharing ideology with those who look different than them is good for American society. On the 
other hand, the social identity movement of Trumpism is explicitly socially sorted, bad for 
society, and generates negative social capital (Mason, 2018; Putnam, 2000). So, while these 
trends reveal identity politics among voter motivations from both sides of the 2020 election, it 
remains valid to worry more about Trumpian identity politics than about Biden and Democratic 
identity politics.  
Discussion 
The SDVS reveals a lot about both Trumpism and the opposition to Trumpism that 
defined the 2020 presidential election. Financially, Trump voters and Biden voters are relatively 
similar (when one controls for geography, as sampling by CD does); both Trump and Biden 
voters prefer to identify themselves as middle class, wanting to avoid both the stigma of poverty 
and the superiority of wealth. When it comes to reported annual household income, Trump voters 
tended to have higher incomes than Biden voters, but by a bare margin. Generally, there was 
little fiscal difference between Trump and Biden voters. While at first blush this seems surprising 
considering that many rural Trump voters are proud of being blue collar or working class, the 
significant number of affluent suburban Republicans who have long been a part of the religious 
right drive up the Republican fiscal figures. Neither group revealed particularly strong feelings 
about fiscal identity in the open response section. 
Education is a different story. Cramer’s (2016) theory of rural resentment suggests that 
Republicans from rural America take pride in not having college educations. They are put off by 
elitism, and no greater indicator of liberal elitism exists than the institution of higher education. 
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This hypothesis was generally supported by the data. While the two voter groups were relatively 
close when it came to those with only high school or less than high school educations, 56 percent 
of Biden voters compared to 38 percent of Trump voters had bachelor’s degrees or higher. Put 
differently, Biden voters were 47 percent more likely to have bachelor’s degrees than Trump 
voters. This disparity in education is representative of the asymmetric structures of the two 
parties and two voter bases; Democrats come from diverse backgrounds and have myriad 
specific policy demands while lining up on a few loose, cross-cutting identity traits. While both 
sides seek to win above all else, Republicans are not polarized on policy; they are sorted on 
social identity issues, including education. 
Trump voters are known for rallying around these common social traits in order to form 
their in-group identity. Mason (2018) details the sorting of the American political system, and 
when Trump voters responding to the SDVS were asked to define their identity in their own 
words, they resolutely supported this hypothesis. Trump voters were more likely to point to 
religious and family values while Biden voters were more likely to identify themselves based on 
their political identity or their age, gender, race, or sexual orientation. The open-ended responses 
further emphasized that Trump voters are socially sorted and share a much more consistent group 
identity than Biden voters. Biden voters emphasize bonds with those who are different, 
demonstrating or perhaps performing “woke culture,” the emphasis on understanding privilege 
and discrimination that has merged with the Democratic identity in the era of Trump. This trend 
flowed through when voters were asked to rank a dozen political issues on an importance scale. 
Trump voters were generally less likely than Biden voters to rate issues highly, with Trump 
voters rating only three issues higher than Biden voters: economy, violent crime, and abortion. 
Democratic policy focus was on display again, with Biden voters rating healthcare, COVID, gun 
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policy, race relations, economic inequality, and climate significantly higher than Trump voters. 
At risk of overstating the point, the Democratic party and Joe Biden emphasize policy whereas 
Donald Trump and Republicans do not. 
Next, the SDVS reveals interparty polarization within American politics. This came as 
little surprise; dozens of political scientist have written about the growing rift in America, many 
of whom are cited in this project. I expected to see strong evidence of Trump voters expressing 
strong disdain for their political opponents and strong loyalty to their leader (Trump). Trump 
voting respondents did not disappoint. They see Biden voters as disrespectful, anti-American, 
fooled by the media, and brainwashed. They failed to consistently mention policy disagreements, 
preferring to voice their disdain for the identity of Biden voters rather than their beliefs. They 
indicated their frustration with “cancel culture” and the rejection of conservative ideology. In 
short, they played the role of the Trump voter quite well. However, Biden voters from the SDVS 
were surprisingly hostile, much more hostile than anticipated. Over half of Biden voters believe 
Trump voters to be either wrong, stupid, or misguided. Another 23 percent believe them to be 
brainwashed by the media. Biden voters were less than half as likely as Trump voters to indicate 
respect for the other side. Shockingly, Biden voters measured higher on the crude SDCS hostility 
scale than Trump voters, proving the polarizing effect of Trumpism is not limited to his 
supporters. The resistance has built an identity around political hatred for Trump supporters; as 
Mason’s political gamesmanship heats up, Trump voters seek to “own the libs” as the resistance 
rallies against the injustices of Trumpism. 
These motivated voters show extremely high affective loyalty to their candidates. I 
expected Trump voters maintain their loyalty to Trump, both because of their unwavering 
support throughout the Trump presidency and their unflinching willingness to take signals from 
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him. The relationship between Donald Trump and his voters is undeniably indicative of 
authoritarian populism. As expected, Trump respondents are incredibly loyal. Even after his 
electoral loss and the stunning insurrection at the capitol, 82 percent of SDVS Trump voters 
approved of Trump’s performance as president. Further, 77% of Trump voters believe that 
Trump cares about people like them. Biden rated even higher on this scale, scoring 86 percent. 
When asked why they chose to vote for their candidate, a large number of Trump voters echoed 
typical Trumpian America first, Make America Great Again taglines, while a smaller number 
indicated distaste with Trump that was outweighed by Republican party loyalty. Biden voters, on 
the other hand, were remarkably likely to mention Donald Trump when explaining their vote for 
Biden. The presence of negative partisanship and the politics of competition cannot be overstated 
when it comes to the 2020 election.  
Limitations 
I want to be transparent about some limitations of this research. The era of Trump has 
been marked by a viciously fast-moving news cycle, stressful headlines, political drama, and 
unprecedented conflict. To make matters worse, the global pandemic wreaked havoc on 
Americans’ finances, social lives, and health, rendering the American future more uncertain than 
ever before. Both because of the Trump administration and for reasons outside of its control, the 
last five years have been some of the most difficult and emotional in recent memory. For this 
reason, there are some factors that, if not properly considered, could confound the findings of 
this work. First, the 2020 election was anything but routine. Because of the way the then-
president challenged the results of the election, the electoral process itself, rather than the results, 
became, for a time, became the most discussed political issue. For many Americans, the last 
salient memory they have of the Trump administration was the futile effort to invalidate a free 
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and fair election. This brings us to yet another compounding factor: the January 6, 2021 armed 
insurrection against the United States Capitol. This attack, which resulted in one death and could 
have caused so many more, looms large as the final event of Trump’s term and has critically 
changed how some Americans look on Trumpism. Furthermore, this project, which lends a great 
deal of thought to the rise of Trump, comes nearly six years after the critical launch of 
Trumpism. There is no doubt that the movement has undergone significant change in the 
intervening years, but it is impossible to gauge motivations around Trumpism from the past 
without interference from the present. Thus, our survey results are best informed by the events 
that happened in the weeks and months leading up to the period of data collection. Furthermore, 
there is near-daily evolution to the Trump story and the Trump base. This project has been 
updated frequently to include the most recent events, but there is no reason to expect the 
whirlwind of the 2021 political news environment to slow after this paper is published. It will 
inevitably lack analysis of whatever major event comes next. Lastly, since the beginning of 
Trump’s rise to popularity, political scientists and other academic commentators have claimed 
that Trump supporters are less likely to be honest in polls, worried about the social undesirability 
of identifying as a Trump supporter. This research is imperfect, but it can give us significant 
insight into the mind of American voters. 
  
Chapter 4 
Right Wing Media and Misinformation Among the Trump base 
Donald Trump capitalized on demographic trends and highly polarized social identities in 
order to build a fiercely loyal base. Understanding his ability to manipulate his followers, Trump 
and his administration took on a dangerous campaign to politicize the media, journalism, and 
truth. During the Trump presidency, reporters were thrown out of the briefing room (Abbruzzese 
& Romero, 2018), the president called the press the “enemy of the people” (Simon, 2018), and 
journalists had reason to fear for their safety. One of Trump’s favorite ways to delegitimize the 
media is the phrase “fake news.” No one described what the term means to the former president 
better than he himself in a 2018 tweet:  
The Fake News is working overtime. Just reported that, despite the tremendous success 
we are having with the economy & all things else, 91% of the Network News about me is 
negative (Fake). Why do we work so hard in working with the media when it is corrupt? 
Take away credentials? 
To Trump, any news that is in the slightest way negative is fake. Or, even if he does not 
truly think that the news is false, he has learned that calling a story or an outlet “fake news” is an 
effective way to stop his supporters from believing it. The 
intense loyalty of his followers has led them to 
unreservedly hate the mainstream media, labeling it the 
propaganda arm of the left. Trump’s messaging has been 
enthusiastically picked up by right wing media hosts, who 
relish in attacking center-left media while shamelessly 
airing conspiracy theories and misinformation (Blake, 
Figure 12 
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2021). GOP voter distrust in media has been on the rise since the late 20th century, but when 
Trump came roaring on to the political stage, Republicans reached an all-time low in trust in 
media (Figure 12, Conroy, 2021). Trumpism, which is steeped in shared social identity, has 
adopted mistrust and disapproval of media into amalgamation of beliefs shard amongst Trump 
voters (Conroy, 2021). At the same time, media hosts have adopted the identity and rhetoric of 
Trumpism, maximizing ratings by engaging in the America first, xenophobic language of the 
Trump base. Chapter three discussed the hostility felt between voter groups; this chapter will 
look at the role that media plays in exacerbating the Trump base’s distrust and dislike of those 
who are not part of their movement.  
This chapter will look at the Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey (SDVS) data 
around media and misinformation, suggesting that Trump voters’ readiness to believe Trump and 
rally behind him on nearly any issue represents a threat to American democracy and indicates 
that Trumpism’s longevity may continue to outlast his tenure in office.  
Media and Fake News 
One of the defining characteristics of the Trump movement and the Trump administration 
was and is misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation, which is untruths spread by 
people who believe that what they are saying, sharing, or promoting is true, and disinformation, 
which is the intentional dissemination of lies or partial truths, have furthered the divide between 
American political parties, making truth a highly politicized issue. Media plays an important role 
in this phenomenon. First, there are the conservative media corporations who actually spread 
misinformation and disinformation. In the waning months of the Trump administration, this 
“real” fake news was centered around two key issues: the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2020 
presidential election. News networks like Fox News (especially the late-night hosts like Sean 
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Hannity and Tucker Carlson, who more closely represent political talking heads than journalists), 
One America News Network (OANN), and NewsMax were responsible for spreading and 
elevating Trump’s lies about the coronavirus and the election results (Garber, 2020). The lies 
about the pandemic have likely resulted in increased loss of life as those who believed them 
spurned critical health and safety measures such as mask wearing and physical distancing. The 
lies about the election resulted in widespread distrust of the American presidential electoral 
process and, eventually, violence and loss of life at the capitol on January 6, 2021.  
Misinformation and “fake news” have also been adopted as rallying cries of the right, 
who claim that media outlets like CNN, The New York Times, and the Washington Post are 
peddlers of false narratives of the left and refuse to publish the “real” version of the story. Trump 
has encouraged his supporters to believe that these institutions push anti-Trump and left-wing 
propaganda, and this was evident among Trump supporters in the SDVS. One survey respondent 
wrote that Biden supporters have been “Duped. Swallowed hook, line, and sinker . . .the so-
called national news media spitting out negative propaganda about Trump even months before he 
was elected in 2016 all the way through [the] 2020 election and is STILL doing the same thing.” 
This voter, who is obviously concerned with the perceived fake news of the left, was himself 
persuaded by disinformation from Trump, Fox News, and other sources of alt-right media. He 
continues his comment: “I wonder now if [Biden voters] know that VP Kamala Harris is actually 
the one making decisions, not poor old senile Joe. Prop him up, give him a pen or his medicine 
so he can function a bit. Never seen this in my lifetime. Maybe Eisenhower after his strokes 
when VP Nixon took over.” Here, he expresses belief in multiple conspiracy theories as well as 
frustration that the other side does not see the truth behind these conspiracy theories. Distrust in 
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reputable media sources among Trump voters seems to push them to fringe right-wing outlets, 
where conspiracy theories fester and proliferate.  
In order to gauge how typical voters view the media, survey respondents were asked to 
indicate where they felt the “mainstream media” fell on a five-point ideological scale that ranged 
from liberal to conservative. Figure 13 reflects the results. A whopping 72 percent of Trump 
voters believe that mainstream media is liberal, a number that edges up to 82 percent when those 
who rated media “somewhat liberal” are included. Only five percent of Trump voters view 
mainstream media as a neutral source of information. In comparison, nearly half of Biden voters 
viewed media as neutral, with the majority of the remainder rating mainstream media “somewhat 
liberal.” While there seems to be a consensus about the direction of media’s tilt, Trump voters 
believe media to be more extremely aligned on the left while Biden voters perceive a much more 
subtle lean. By associating the established media with the opposing side (recall Mason, 2018) 
Figure 13 
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and the gamesmanship that voters perceive in partisan politics), Trump voters are expressing a 
form of anti-elitism. If mainstream media is seen as a propaganda machine of the left and the 
political left is an anti-American group standing in the way of the “real” American people’s 
agenda, then the distrust of mainstream media among Trump voters can be construed as a 
populist expression of elite hatred and the rejection of experts and facts.  Of course, the 
perceived ideology of mainstream media is not a direct measure of populist resentment towards 
Democrats, Biden voters, or elites, but it presents a stark contrast between voter groups. If an 
opposite or reactive sentiment existed among Biden’s voters, one would expect to see Biden 
voters reporting an extreme conservative bias among the media; thus, this one area where there is 
stark contrast between Trump voters and Biden voters.  
While the difference between Trump and Biden 
voters shown here is stark, it may be best explained as 
yet another long-term trend among Republicans than a 
consequence of Trumpism. An Obama-era Pew 
Research Center study found that 76 percent of 
Republicans compared to 54 percent of Democrats 
viewed news organizations as politically biased (2011). 
The same report found that the trend of growing distrust 
in media and perceptions of media bias has been relatively steady since about 1985. Unlike my 
findings, however, the Pew study found that the gap between perceived media bias between 
Democrats and Republicans was narrowing over time (Figure 14). This data is nearly ten years 
old, and newer data suggests that the trend of rising Democratic distrust in media faltered as 
Trumpism and Trump-obedient Republicans aligned themselves against journalism, truth, and 
Figure 14 
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science, making the press and news industry into a political issue. Another, more recent Pew 
study finds that 91 percent of Republicans compared to 69 percent of Democrats “think news 
coverage favors one side” (Walker & Gottfried, 2020). Perhaps Republicans were so willing to 
embrace Trump’s anti-news media messaging because their frustration and distrust of the news 
media was so high already. When they found a candidate who was willing to express that 
frustration, they lined up behind him. One survey respondent wrote that they voted for Trump 
because “he wasn't afraid to tell the truth to the American people,” whereas the rest of the elite 
system, the politicians, the journalists, the scientists, have left Trump supporters behind. 
The Big Lie 
Just as central to Trumpism as distrust in traditional media is the subscription to 
misinformation and conspiracy theory. While Trump told the American people and his 
supporters a plethora of lies during his tenure as president (The Washington Post tallied the total 
number of Trump lies as president at 30,573, see their massive database of Trump lies here), one 
of his most consequential lies was what is now known as “the big lie,” the insistence that the 
2020 presidential election was rigged, that Donald Trump was the true winner, and that Joe 
Biden is an illegitimate president elevated to the position by conspiracy and fraud. This belief 
has been picked up by other Republican politicians at the local, state, and national levels along 
with a large portion of Trump’s voter base. In February of 2021, 76 percent of Republicans 
believed that there had been widespread voter fraud in the election (Malloy & Schwartz, 2021). 
In order to measure the extent to which survey respondents were tuned into the “big lie,” they 
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were asked “To what extent do you believe the following: "Donald Trump won the 2020 
Presidential Election, not Joe Biden."  
Now, the aforementioned Quinnipiac poll, the one that found that 76 percent of 
Republicans believe voter fraud played a role in the 2020 election, does not ask respondents 
whether they believe that 
the election as stolen or 
wrongly decided. On the 
contrary, my survey asks 
for respondents to rate 
their agreement with a 
more extreme version of 
the lie, so it stands to 
reason that fewer than 76 
percent of Republicans believe that the election was stolen as opposed to simply being riddled 
with fraud. As figure 15 shows, 44 percent of surveyed Trump voters agree that Donald Trump 
was the true winner of the 2020 presidential election. In comparison, only 4 percent of Biden 
voters agreed with the statement, with 91 percent of those voters strongly disagreeing.  
These findings represent further evidence that Trump voters are engaged in a brand of 
anti-democratic populism. Calling elections into question and challenging the legitimacy of a 
fairly elected government is one of the most common traits of populism (Mounk, 2018). Hoping 
to better understand why respondents believe the “big lie,” I asked those who agreed or strongly 
agreed that Donald Trump was the true winner of the 2020 election, “why do you think that so 
many people believe that Joe Biden won the 2020 election fairly?” Of the 17 Republicans who 
Figure 15 
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were asked this question, only 12 gave substantive an intelligible answers. Of those 12, half 
blamed the media and media-related brainwashing for the refusal of the establishment to 
recognize Trump’s authentic victory. Here is a sample of the media responses: 
1. The media doesn't report the disreputable things democrats did. Also, protected 
Biden as he hid in his basement and didn't campaign. 
2. Because people are brainwashed and believe everything they see on the media 
3. A lot of cases have been dismissed and hardly any news coverage of fraud 
Notice how “the media” takes on agency for these voters as if the media itself is the force 
preventing Trump from taking power. In the second response, there is a clear establishment of an 
in and out-group mentality; this voter sees “people” or “them” as the enemy who are working 
against the proper patriotic nation. Those who do not see the world the way the Trump 
movement sees the world are inherently opposed to Trump and therefore anti-American. Another 
Trump voter exposes just how susceptible she is to Trump lies when she responds, “because they 
rigged the election and [Biden] did get the most electoral votes and the most popular vote but 
there were votes from people who were dead and in prison it wasn’t a fair election.” In this short 
answer, she indicates her subscription to three separate Trump conspiracy theories: that the 
election was rigged, that dead people voted in significant numbers, and that prisoners voted 
illegally. According to the Trump Twitter Archive, Trump tweeted multiple times about all three 
of these theories between the November 2020 election and the suspension of his Twitter account 
in early January. The obedience of Trump’s followers is startling, suggesting a devotion to the 
leader of the movement that cannot be explained by party loyalty, identity sorting, or other 
common American explanations for voter behavior. The SDVS Biden voters who compared 
Trump’s base to a cult may not have been particularly far off.  




The SDVS examined the ability of Trump and right-wing media to feed misinformation 
and disinformation into the minds of voters. In the late Trump presidency, two focal areas of 
misinformation loom above the rest: the seriousness of the pandemic and “the big lie,” the 
insistence that Donald Trump only lost the 2020 election because of cheating, illegal voting, and 
a rigged system. His lies are consequential. Trump supporters around the country have 
minimized the pandemic, refused to wear masks, and are now refusing vaccination. Because of 
the effectiveness of this lie, I expected the “big lie” to be fairly popular among Trump voters. 
The SDVS found that a plurality (44 percent) of Trump voters either somewhat or strongly agree 
that “Donald Trump won the 2020 election,” a statement that is simply not true. As a reminder, 
these data were collected over six weeks after the insurrection at the capitol and over four weeks 
after Trump left office. The incredible loyalty of the Trump base is on display: they will insist 
that a lie is fact if their leader tells them to. This phenomenon is aided by Trump’s and his 
supporters’ campaign to delegitimize the media. Over 80 percent of Trump voters believe that 
the “mainstream media” is liberally biased, often blaming the media in open response answers 
for the perceived stupidity of Biden voters. When it comes to media, there is little to say about 
Biden voters. They watch the news and believe the facts. They are aware that Joe Biden won the 
election and that the pandemic is real. This is a story about the intense identity-linked loyalty of 
Trump voters that drives them to believe blatant lies, reject truth from journalistic sources, and 
label any dissenters as un-American. Taking signals from their leader, they reject the reporting of 
center and center-left institutions and instead believe the Trumpist spins fed to them by the right 
wing media conglomerate. The power of Trump to delegitimize media is perhaps best 
exemplified by his post-election attacks on Fox News. Trump sent or retweeted at least 12 tweets 
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disparaging the network in the days after the election, angry that Fox News had called Arizona 
for Biden earlier than the other networks.  After the tweets, Trump supporters across the country 
participating inn “Stop the Steal” protests took up the chant “Fox News Sucks,” echoing 
Trump’s anger at their once-favorite network (Beckett, 2020). While much about the hostility 
and motivation of Biden voters in the SDVS was surprising and suggests a deeper shared identity 
among Biden voters than I expected to find, no finding was as disturbing as the power that 
Trump and the right wing apparatus wield over Trump voters.  
  
Conclusion 
The Future of American Politics in the Context of Trumpism 
 The months following the 2016 election of Donald Trump were, for many, filled with 
fear, anger, and uncertainty. People of color, trans people, and people with disabilities had 
legitimate concerns for their safety. Activists and policy advocates were angered by the 
impending backwards progress in their field. Immigrants and first generation U.S. citizens 
worried about their status in America. Some of this anxiety faded as Republicans proved their 
inability to legislate even with a unified government in Washington, and even more dissipated as 
the Democrats came sweeping back in the 2018 midterms. However, the anxiety that 
accompanied the 2016 election results was ignited once more as the greatest international health 
crisis perhaps of all time gripped the nation. Americans, locked down in their homes, watched in 
shocked horror as the leader of the free world denied the severity of the virus, attempted to 
circumvent science, and encouraged his followers to disregard medical advice and guidelines. 
Then, in late 2020 and early 2021, Trump and his followers demonstrated that even an electoral 
loss would not slow their movement. Starting on election night when he prematurely declared 
victory, Donald Trump did everything in his power to question the legitimacy and veracity of the 
2020 election results. The Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey analyzed in the preceding 
chapters showed that even several weeks after the commencement of the Biden administration, a 
plurality of Trump voters believed that Donald Trump was the true winner of the 2020 election. 
The culmination of this particular Trump disinformation campaign was, of course, the January 6, 
2021 riot at the United States capitol. It has become clear during the Trump era that Trumpism 
has the potential to cause unrest, make people feel unsafe, and dismantle democracy. What is 
unclear, however, is what remains of Trumpism in the wake of the 45th president’s departure 
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from office. Will he run again? Where will Trumpism go if Trump is not around? How will the 
Trumpian identity proceed in the months and years following the Trump administration? How 
have Democrats reacted and how should they continue to react to Trumpism in years and 
elections to come? 
 One of the central findings of this project and the body of political science research built 
around the Trump movement is that the trends that gave us Trumpism have been in motion much 
longer than Donald Trump has been involved in politics. Since before he published Bowling 
Aone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community in 2000, Robert Putnam has been 
warning about the decline of social capital in the United States. Bridging relationships that used 
to exist by way of small town social groups, card games, and bowling leagues have fallen by the 
wayside, replaced by bonding relationships made through partisan news media, Facebook 
groups, and social sorting. Lilliana Mason (2018) adds to this concern, describing growing 
polarization in America as Republicans and Democrats become socially sorted. The two parties, 
she finds, have come to resemble rival professional athletic teams, focused only on beating one 
another and cultivating blindly loyal followings. Policy has taken a back seat in influencing the 
choices that voters make choices at the polls; identity and affinity are now the chief motivating 
factors for American voters. In a study that makes an even stronger argument that these trends 
predate Trump, Carnes and Lupu (2021) find that, while the white working class has been 
supporting Republicans at a higher rate over recent election, Donald Trump did not increase 
white working class support at a fast rate than did Romney or Bush (though McCain did have 
decreased white working class support in 2008). The great consequence of Donald Trump is not 
mass movement of white working class Americans to the Republican party, it is the accelerated 
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evolution of the identity of cultural whiteness that has come to bind together the Republican 
base. 
 This unifying social identity, what I referred to in chapter one as the “new identity 
politics” of Donald Trump, has taken strong hold of the Republican base. In chapter three, I 
indicate that some 20 to 25 percent of Republican Trump voters likely fall into a category of 
Trump-hesitant voters, but that leaves a large majority of Republican voters who hold 
membership in the Trump base. The identity is built around a strong belief in individualism, 
Christian social values, America First policy, the preservation of white hegemony in America, 
and the distrust and fear of immigrants and people of color. This identity exists in stark contrast 
to the evolving Democratic base; liberals have radically embraced “woke culture” and anti-
discrimination slogans and rhetoric, including Black Lives Matter, Defund the Police, and 
#MeToo. Whereas Trumpism has become a culture of exclusiveness, the 2020 Democratic party 
became the party of radical inclusion. This is not to say that the Democratic party is free from 
racism or bigotry, but the politics of acceptance has certainly become the emphasis of the party.  
 The changes that Trump ushered in will not be limited to the scope of his presidency. 
David Graham, a writer for The Atlantic, wrote an April 2021 article entitled “What Ever 
Happened to Donald Trump? Just months after leaving office, the former president has all but 
disappeared.” In the article, Graham calls attention to the significant drop in attention that Trump 
has received on social and news media since he left office, calling the former president 
“[relatively] irrelevant.” Comparing him to other former presidents, the author concludes that 
Trump’s power is dwindling, leaving him with little more ability than to sink Republican 
candidates who break from Trumpism. “The basic problem for Trump,” writes Graham, “is that 
Arnold    
 
82 
despite his best and most nefarious efforts, he is no longer president. He just doesn’t matter that 
much now.”  
 Articles and tweets like this, celebrating the departure of Trump from the daily news 
cycle and his diminished influence over American politics, have become relatively common in 
the days since the Biden inauguration and the Trump twitter ban. However, this argument misses 
something about the strength and endurance of the identity behind the success of Trumpism. Yes, 
public interest in Donald Trump has dropped and the former president has a greatly diminished 
public platform, but his relevance and the consequence of his influence on American politics is 
just as salient as it was the day he left office. Democrats and established ideologically moderate 
Republicans see Trump’s departure as an opportunity for a less extreme, unifying Republican 
candidate to rise out of the parties disheveled ranks. However, these types of GOP members are 
leaving the party in droves and the “new new right,” (or the “socially conservative right,” or the 
“Trump right,” or whatever term we want to use for Trumpian Republicans) are gaining in 
numbers with every passing election. Specifically, five Republican senators and several 
prominent Republican congresspeople have announced that they will not be seeking reelection in 
2022 (Peoples, 2021). The non-Trump wing of the Republican party is falling apart. Kevin 
McCarthy, the Republican leader in the House of Representatives, has already strongly signaled 
his support for Trumpism by endorsing the big lie and publicly feuding with Conference Chair 
Representative Liz Cheney over her opposition to Trump and resistance to challenging election 
results. Among the party elites, the Republicanism of even five or six short years ago has been 
overrun by Trumpism. Yes, Trump is gone (or so it seems), but the politicians who grew and 
evolved out of his brand of politics are gaining power.  
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 Elites are only part of the story when it comes to the persistence of the Trump base. 
Trump voters, as both theorists and the SDVS found, tend to hold the populist belief that their 
movement is the only truly patriotic movement with American interests at heart. Opponents, they 
insist, are anti-American and corrupted by liberal and media indoctrination. Any attempt to push 
back against the Trumpians is the work of “cancel culture” and a violation of first amendment 
rights. One of the most telling findings of the SDVS is that Trump voters continue to believe 
Trump’s misinformation and lies even after his departure. While Trump led the movement for a 
time, it was not derived from Trump and is fully capable of existing without him. The blind 
loyalty and groupthink of the loudest and most active Trump supporters will not dwindle, 
thought it may latch onto a new candidate. For four years they were encouraged speak aloud the 
racism that existed quietly for decades; little suggests that the electoral defeat has reversed this 
trend. Even in mid-April of 2021, controversial Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene is 
planning to start the “America First Caucus14” along with fellow conservative members Matt 
Gaetz, Paul Gosar, Louie Gohmert, and Barry Moore (Diaz et al., 2021; Punchbowl News, 2021). 
A leaked flier about the new group includes a summary of its position on immigration: “History 
has shown that societal trust and political unity are threatened when foreign citizens are imported 
en-masse into a country . . .the long-term existential future of America . . .being put at 
unnecessary risk is something our leaders can afford to ignore no longer” (2021). The nativism 
inherent in this document and the caucus behind it is concerning. The departure of Donald 
Trump has not signaled the retreat of white supremacy, American exceptionalism, or xenophobia 
into the shadows of society; rather, it has triggered the rearrangement of the leadership of the 
 
14 In the days after this story was leaked by Punchbowl, Greene walked back her plans to launch the caucus. At the 
time of this article’s publishing, she inn longer planning the launch (Diaz, 2021). 
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movement to return these ideas to the mainstream. The incorporation of (white) America First 
rhetoric into the GOP identity represents a permanent effect of Trumpism.  
 Right-wing media has also shown increasingly high tolerance for nativist rhetoric in the 
days after Donald Trump left office. Fox News primetime host Tucker Carlson demonstrated his  
willingness to publicly express his concern about immigrants of color in a series of monologues 
in mid-April 2021. Carlson expounded on what is known as the “Great Replacement,” a white 
supremacist theory that, with the support of Jews and other elites in power, immigrant people of 
color are going to replace white Europeans in society.  Here are some recent excerpts from 
Tucker Carlson Tonight, America’s most watched news program (Joyella, 2021): 
“The Democratic party is trying to replace the current electorate, the voters now casting 
ballots, with new people, more obedient voters, from the Third World” (8 April 2021). 
“If you’re over 40, you may have trouble recognizing your own country; it’s just too 
unfamiliar. . .you cannot inflict relentless social change and expect your society to 
survive; things will fall apart if you do that . . .they’re changing everything . . .a brand 
new national population” (14 April 2021). 
“Middle-class Americans become less powerful every year. They have less economic 
power. And thanks to mass immigration, they now have less political power” (12 April 
2021). (qtd. in Slisco, 2021). 
Carlson and those like him are paid, first and foremost, to maximize viewership. It can be 
reasonably inferred, therefore, that the constantly high ratings of shows like Carlson’s or Hannity 
indicate widespread support for the ideas that the right-wing hosts discuss among some sector of 
the American public. Likewise, the hosts encourage the proliferation of nativism among their 
viewers. Thus, the relationship between Trumpism and right wing media becomes a self-
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escalating echo chamber in which shared right wing beliefs become louder and more extreme as 
they travel back and forth between like-minded people. If the identity of Trumpism was not 
enough to guarantee its longevity, the consistent white supremacist and protectionist noise 
provided by Fox News will help to maintain the new status quo of the GOP.  
 Importantly, while it is true that polarization is the name of the game and that Democrats 
are also engaged in identity politics, the outcome of the Democratic party’s response to 
Trumpism was a moderate president. Yes, there is a progressive and left wing side to the 
Democratic party and the party as a whole has moved to the left in recent years, but the party 
continues to exist as a compromise between center-left and progressive. While Alexandria 
Ocasio-Cortez dominates the right wing news cycle’s stories about Democrats, centrist Senator 
Joe Manchin wields significantly more power in Washington than his progressive co-partisan 
from the lower chamber. Democrats represent a base far more diverse than that of Republicans, 
and, for that reason, are prevented from embracing extreme views or positions of the far left.  
That being said, the SDVS turned up some interesting and unexpected finding about 
Biden voters. Respondents who voted for Biden were far more likely to self-report hostile 
feelings towards the other side than Trump voters. While this finding certainly calls for deeper 
investigation, it suggests a profoundness to the Democratic identity that existing theory fails to 
predict. Everything in the literature and the common understanding of the current political binary 
signal that Trump voters are hostile populists while Biden voters are policy-oriented and, in 
some cases, scared. The SDVS may be a preliminary indication that liberal identity is just as 
established–if not more so–than Trumpism. Alternatively, it may mean that Trump aversion and 
the alliance built around the ‘resistance’ was fueled by a resentment greater than that felt by rural 
Americans for the elite. The SDVS data, as it currently exists, only allows me to speculate as to 
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the reason for Biden voter hostility towards Trump voters, but it certainly has the potential to 
change the way political scientists differentiate between the two voter groups. I urge further 
investigation into this phenomenon. 
Partisan Prescriptions and Areas for Further Inquiry 
 The last five years of political life have been an absolute roller coaster. We went from a 
relatively moderate though somewhat polarizing president in Barack Obama to a populist 
outsider who constantly threatened the very core of American democracy for four years, and then 
back to the near-centrist vice president from the immediately preceding administration. The way 
the parties respond to this moment in American history is critical to their success in the coming 
years.  
 The Republican party is at a difficult crossroads. Donald Trump has a strong grip on 
fundraising and the attitudes of the right. While he has been de-platformed, he still has the ability 
to pick up a phone and dial into Fox and Friends any time he wishes. Further, the 45th president 
has yet to rule out another run at the presidency in 2024. It is difficult, at this point, to imagine 
anyone beating him out in a primary contest. This puts the few Republicans who have distanced 
themselves from Trump in a complicated position. If the party begins to signal to the Trump base 
that it wants to move away from Trumpism only to have Trump announce his candidacy, the rift 
in the party will be driven even deeper than it already is. Because the base still see itself as 
Trump’s base, the party must either decide to take a painful loss as it attempts to realign away 
from nativism or embrace Trumpism in full. But remember, the Republican base is not aligned 
on policy, it is aligned on social identity. In the absence of Trump himself, the elites in the party 
should, theoretically, be able to ostracize Trumpism from the party ranks without losing major 
support. Social identity is tied to shared social, religious, ethnic, and geographic traits, not a 
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politician. However, the Republican party has shown no ability to make an organized play at the 
socially conservative base that is independent of Trump. Thus, he remains the greatest wildcard 
and most powerful player in Republican electoral politics. Further research into Trump voters 
feelings toward Republicans who have distanced themselves from Trump would help determine 
whether voters are likely to accept a moderate Republican candidate–or, for that matter, anyone 
other than Trump. 
 The Democrats face a different set of circumstances. They are coming off of two 
relatively successful election cycles: the 2018 midterms and the 2020 presidential. Both elections 
were defined by intense dissatisfaction with the status quo. Massive grassroots organizing efforts 
to turnout the vote and oust Donald Trump have lit the Democratic path for the past four years 
(Williamson & Memfis, 2020). Heading into 2022, the Democrats must find a way to channel the 
momentum of anti-Trump voter excitement in the absence of the common enemy. The SDVS 
showed the Biden voters were disturbed by the groupthink and nativist beliefs of Trump 
supporters. If they want to maintain the movement evoked by fear of the alt-right, Democrats 
must continue to emphasize the rising tide of the populist right even as they emphasize popular 
policy positions. They should emphasize the changes that the GOP is undergoing. In races where 
Republicans run Trumpist candidates who continue to engage in Trumpian rhetoric, this will be 
easily done. Democrats will need to adopt new strategies than they have used in recent years if 
Republicans make a move to the center. Party higher-ups from both sides should pay close 
attention to races involving Trump-distanced Republicans in 2022. Democrats will likely have to 
simultaneously run against Republicanism and Trumpism. Here, full length interviews with 
Democratic voters would offer insight into voter behavior. Was anti-Trump voting what made 
the marginal difference in 2020 or did Biden key in on something deeper in his campaign? Can 
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the energy of the Democratic base be maintained without the enemy that motivates it? These 
questions and more need to be addressed by future research.   
 Globally, the American political system is at a dangerous crossroads. Polarization is at an 
all-time high and political violence, whether in the form of insurrection at the capitol or protests 
against police brutality,15 is constantly in the news. This moment calls for academic investigation 
into the motivation of insurrectionists and those of leftist political protestors; there is much that 
differentiates these groups, but they may have more in common than was previously thought. 
Understanding the loud minorities at the extremes of either party might help the field to 
understand the whole.  
 Cramer’s study (2016) has told us that rural Americans feel left behind by elite America. 
The success of Donald Trump and the results of the SDVS have proved her right. Lilliana 
Mason’s (2018) book told us that social sorting threatens to drive polarization to yet unrealized 
heights. The SDVS found high hostility between voter groups and high loyalty to in-group 
candidates. It is easy to imagine how both of these trends could continue, but they do not have to. 
Mason implores us to make those cross-cutting relationships by getting to know people who 
think and look differently than us.  
One of the most polarizing, echo-chamber encouraging problems in politics is social 
media. On Twitter and Facebook, politically active people cultivate timelines of like-minded 
others, engaging in virtual social sorting wherein those cross-cutting accounts can be easily 
blocked or unfollowed. Eitan Hersh16 (2020), a scholar of online political activity, refers to these 
 
15 The insurrection at the capitol was a treasonous assault on the United States Government. The protests in the wake 
of police killings of unarmed black men and children are justified demonstrations against a broken system of 
enforcement. They are compared here not as a gesture of equivalence but simply to note the unrest that exists among 
both the left and the right.   
16 If you find yourself doom scrolling nightly or frustrated at election results but feeling powerless to change 
anything, go read Hersh’s book. It is a sympathetic yet motivating call to action that a lot of us need to hear.  
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people as “political hobbyists” (p. 3). For them, almost all of their interaction with politics is 
online or on the television. Hersh has a simple recommendation: stop spending time on political 
hobbyism and go make actual change in the world. Join the local Republican or Democratic 
party, volunteer for a campaign, or simply talk to your neighbors who vote differently than you 
(p. 216). 2020 and the first half of 2021 have been scarred by the pandemic. Americans were 
forced to interact online and over the internet. As we begin to come out of our homes and see 
each other once more, take some time away from Twitter rants and online political contributions 
and go talk to that neighbor who you know always votes the opposite way as you. Talk to your 
like-minded friends about getting involved in politics in real life and making a real difference. 
What do Trumpism and political hostility mean about America’s future? That is up to each and 
every one of us to decide.  
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Full Midwestern Swing District Voter Survey Questionnaire Text 
Start of Block: Screener 1 
 
S1 In which state do you currently reside? 










S3 Did you vote in the 2020 presidential election? 
1. Yes  (1)  
2. No  (2)  
 
End of Block: Screener 1 
 
Start of Block: Consent 
 
R1 Congratulations! We’d like to invite you to participate in this research study.  Please 
read and accept the below acknowledgment to proceed to the survey.     I hereby acknowledge 
and agree that: - I understand that I am a participant in a research project. 
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 - I understand that I will be asked about recent political events and my reactions to those events. 
 - I understand that my responses to this research will be confidential and that after the discussion 
today, no parties will re-contact me about the topics discussed today, or ask me to change my 
voting or other behavior based on this information. 
 - I certify and represent that I have read this Release, fully understand its meaning and effect, 
and agree to participate.     Click “Yes” to agree to participate or click “No” to decline to 
participate.    
3. Yes  (1)  
4. No  (2)  
 
End of Block: Consent 
 
Start of Block: Voting history 
 
 
V100 Who did you vote for in the 2020 election? 
5. Donald Trump  (1)  
6. Joe Biden  (2)  
7. Other (please specify)  (3) ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Voting history 
 
Start of Block: Main body 
 
Txt1 We are going to ask you some questions about your political beliefs and your 
political identity. We appreciate open and honest answers and are looking for rich and detailed 
Arnold    
 
105 
















Q30 In this survey, we are interested in hearing from real people about how they see 
themselves and the issues that matter to them. To start, how would you describe yourself to 













Q40 What do you think are the most important issues facing people like you? Please 
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Q45 Please rate following political issues based on how important they are to you.  
 










Economy (1)  8.  9.  10.  11.  12.  




18.  19.  20.  21.  22.  
The 
Coronavirus 
Outbreak (4)  
23.  24.  25.  26.  27.  
Violent Crime 
(5)  
28.  29.  30.  31.  32.  
Foreign Policy 
(6)  
33.  34.  35.  36.  37.  
Gun Policy (7)  38.  39.  40.  41.  42.  
Race and 
Ethnic 
Inequality (8)  
43.  44.  45.  46.  47.  
Immigration 
(9)  
48.  49.  50.  51.  52.  
Economic 
Inequality (10)  
53.  54.  55.  56.  57.  
Climate 
Change (11)  
58.  59.  60.  61.  62.  




Display This Question: 
If Who did you vote for in the 2020 election? = Donald Trump 
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Q55 (Q50=Trump) We live in a polarized time in which people have disagreements with 









Display This Question: 
If Who did you vote for in the 2020 election? != Donald Trump 
 
 
Q55 (Q50≠Trump) We live in a polarized time in which people have disagreements with 
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Q60 In general, do you believe that mainstream media is more conservative or more 
liberal?  
68. Liberal  (1)  
69. Somewhat Liberal  (2)  
70. Neutral  (3)  
71. Somewhat conservative  (4)  





Q65 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Donald 
Trump won the 2020 presidential election, not Joe Biden. 
73. Strongly Disagree  (1)  
74. Somewhat Disagree  (2)  
75. Neither Agree nor Disagree  (3)  
76. Somewhat Agree  (4)  
77. Strongly Agree  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Donald Trump won the 2020 p... = 
Somewhat Agree 
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Q66 Why do you think so many people believe that Joe Biden won the 2020 election 






Q70 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
${V100/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoicesTextEntry} cares about people like me? 
78. Strongly disagree  (1)  
79. Somewhat disagree  (2)  
80. Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
81. Somewhat agree  (4)  
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Q80 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump handled his job as 
president? 
83. Strongly Disapprove  (1)  
84. Disapprove  (2)  
85. No Opinion  (3)  
86. Approve  (4)  





Q90 Who did you vote for in the 2016 presidential election? 
88. Donald Trump  (1)  
89. Hillary Clinton  (2)  
90. Other  (3) ________________________________________________ 
91. I did not vote  (4)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Who did you vote for in the 2020 election? = Donald Trump 
And Who did you vote for in the 2016 presidential election? != Donald Trump 
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Q100 (Swing to Trump What made you vote for Donald Trump in 2020 even though you 








Display This Question: 
If Who did you vote for in the 2016 presidential election? = Donald Trump 
And Who did you vote for in the 2020 election? != Donald Trump 
 
 








End of Block: Main body 
 
Start of Block: Demographics 
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D10 Which political party do you most closely identify with?  
92. Democrat  (1)  
93. Republican  (2)  
94. Independent  (3)  




D20 What is your gender? 
96. Male  (1)  
97. Female  (2)  
98. Prefer not to say  (3)  
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D30 If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you 
say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class? 
100. Lower class  (4)  
101. Working Class  (5)  
102. Middle Class  (6)  
103. Upper Class  (7)  




D40 What is the highest level of education or degree that you have completed?  
105. High school, No Diploma  (1)  
106. High School Graduate  (2)  
107. Some College  (3)  
108. Associate's Degree (AA, AS)  (4)  
109. Bachelor's Degree (BA, BS)  (5)  
110. Master's Degree (MA, MS, etc.)  (6)  
111. Professional Degree beyond a Bachelor's Degree (MD, DDS, DVM, JD, etc.)  (7)  
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D50 What was your 2019 total household income (we're looking for typical income, 
though we understand that the pandemic has caused changes in 2020 income for many people)? 
113. $0-$24,999  (1)  
114. $25,000-$49,999  (2)  
115. $50,000-$74,999  (3)  
116. $75,000-$99,999  (4)  
117. $100,000-$124,999  (5)  




D60 What is your racial or ethnic identity? (select as many as apply) 
1. American Indian or Alaskan Native  (1)  
2. Asian/Pacific Islander  (2)  
3. Black or African American  (3)  
4. Hispanic American  (4)  
5. White/Caucasian  (5)  
6. Other/Multiple identities (please specify)  (6) 
________________________________________________ 
 




























Table 2: SDVS Respondents 
Table 2: Self-Reported Social Class by 2020 voter group, homes state, and gender 
 




Table 3: Education by voter group, home state, and gender 
